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Abstract
This thesis examines the reasons for the declining role of youth as effective
political players since the Egyptian Revolution. Particularly looking at the
“Revolutionary Youth”, this study investigates why their activism over the course of
the past four years could not translate into political power that would lead to the
realization of the goals of the revolution. Resource Mobilization Theory, Political
Opportunity Structure and Framing constitute a tri-lens through which the political
experience of the youth is analyzed in this research. This thesis argues that a) the
youth’s organizational dilemma; b) their reliance on protest as the exclusive tool to
practice politics; c) and their failure to develop a culturally resonant discourse that
attends to people’s socio-economic needs are the reasons for their marginal role in the
post-revolution period. Relying on interviews with youth activists as well as a
thorough survey of youth movements online pages, this research provides fresh
insights evaluating the youth experience and presents a point of departure for further
research. By understanding social movements as expressions of youth political
engagement, the study also aims to highlight the characteristics and implications the
“youthful” nature of the revolution has on the ongoing struggle.
Keywords: Youth, Revolutionary Youth, Egypt, Post-Revolution, Social Movement
Theories, January 25th
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Chapter 1: Setting the Stage
1.1 Introduction
“Revolution Youth” is a term that has emerged in the last four years in Egypt
acquiring a lot of popularity both in the media and in scholarly studies. After the
downfall of Mubarak, the two most organized and established entities, namely the
military and the Muslim Brotherhood, were able to direct the political scene while
youth, who ignited the revolution, were pushed to the margins. The activism of the
revolutionary forces could not translate into political power that would lead to the
realization of the goals of the revolution. A plethora of youth-inspired organizations,
movements and initiatives emerged over the past four years to occupy the public
space and carve an independent path for pushing towards “bread, freedom and social
justice,” the main slogans that the revolution raised. However, these efforts were
faced with tremendous obstacles and setbacks.
With the newly acclaimed public space the revolution liberated, some youth
formed new political parties or joined recently established ones, while others
remained as pressure groups preferring to affect the political scene without being part
of the official political game. Other groups of youth acted through different
affiliations such as students’ movements and soccer fans associations, like the
“Ultras.” At different stages throughout the transitional period, various attempts at
unification and collaborating efforts appeared through the creation of youth coalitions
and revolutionary fronts. The fact remains that the majority of the youth participants
in the revolution stayed ‘unorganized’ and the revolution remained disempowered.
Occasionally mobilized by the more organized revolutionary groups, these youth
remain the vital force of the revolution that is able to tip the balance of power at any
given point.
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From all the revolution’s scenes, two are contrasting and most revealing:
January 25, 2011 and July 26, 2013. In a way, these two scenes display the extent of
change that has happened in two years. January 25, 2011 represents the youth’s
power, innovation and ability to mobilize. The scene of Tahrir, filled with tens of
thousands of people at night, epitomized the struggles of social movements for
freedom, democracy and human rights over a decade preceding 2011. That day is also
symbolic in that it attested to the power of social media and the ability of the educated
urban middle class youth to reach out to larger segments of the society and ignite the
first flames of the uprising. In terms of power balance, the youth who were backed by
the people had the upper hand. For the first time, they were on the offensive while the
regime was on the defensive. They got to decide collectively their demands and
actively push for them. It was a scene of youth empowerment, people’s power, hope
for the future and a break of the fear barriers.
July 26, 2013 on the other hand, is the exemplification of the complete
opposite. That is the day General Abel Fattah al-Sisi asked the people to take to the
streets to ‘give him a mandate’ to fight ‘terrorism’. A statement understood by many
at the time as a code for a permission to kill the opposition, namely the Muslim
Brotherhood, and violently disperse the Raba`a and Nahda sit-ins. The youth and
revolutionary forces had great suspicion and reservation against Sisi’s request.
However, their voices were marginalized. The scene in Tahrir and elsewhere that day
represented the antithesis of everything January 25, 2011 stood for: the nation is
severely divided and polarized; the masses moved by fear instead of hope for the
future; the revolutionaries on the defensive being called traitors and Muslim
Brotherhood’s sympathizers for their opposition of the rallies. The same people who
once demonstrated for freedom and justice were now blinded by fear and hate, bent
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on annihilating the opposition. The youth who were once active in orchestrating the
scene were pushed aside and had little influence in directing the events on the ground.
It was the coronation of the counter-revolution’s victory.
These two scenes raise the question of what has changed between those two
dates? What made the “Revolutionary Youth” lose their leverage and their ability to
affect the political scene? Why were they successful in mobilizing the people during
the 18 days of the revolution but lost them to the old regime only two years later?
Why weren’t the youth movements able to organize effectively to compete with the
Muslim Brotherhood and the military? How did they shift from being main actors to
marginalized ones over the course of such a short period? These questions represent
several aspects that this study will cover.
1.2 Research Question and Study Objectives
This study aims to answer the question of why and how the youth
revolutionary movements as a whole transformed from being major actors in January
25, 2011 to being marginal players post June 30, 2013. This is based on the
observation that youth played an essential role in organizing and orchestrating the
Egyptian Revolution on January 25 and over the 18 days until the downfall of
Mubarak. Almost four years into the revolution, these same youth figures and
movements are faced with marginalization at best and defaming, persecution and
imprisonment at worst. Their political power has greatly declined and their ability to
affect the political scene is almost non-existent. Comparing those two historical
moments is not the objective of the study, however. What this research is interested in
is uncovering the reasons for the failure of the youth to assert themselves as integral
and effective actors on the political scene to effect the changes they so ardently
advocated.
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The study’s second objective is to understand the dynamics of social
movements in post-revolutionary contexts. What sort of limitations does their form of
organization pose on their effectiveness? How do their ideologies and the way they
frame their demands affect the desired outcomes? What sort of strategies and tactics
are most efficient and best suited to both their function as social movements and the
nature of the political period? What sort of transformations occur to them in the
process of shifting from revolutionary to political movements? This objective relates
to the larger framework of social movements and its findings can be used to
understand similar cases in other countries in the Middle East.
Informed by a large body of literature on social movement theories, I will
focus on resources and especially organization, political process and framing as the
major explanatory factors to answer the main question and the subsequent ones. This
thesis argues that a) the youth’s organizational dilemma; b) their reliance on protest as
the exclusive tool to practice politics; c) and their failure to develop a discourse to
attend to people’s socio-economic needs are the reasons for their marginal role in the
post-revolution period. An overarching theme that runs throughout the thesis is the
relationship between the youthful and the revolutionary. By understanding social
movements as expressions of youth political engagement, this study aims to highlight
the characteristics and implications the “youthful” nature of the revolution has on the
ongoing struggle.
1.3. Chapter Outline
This research consists of four chapters in addition to a conclusion. The first
chapter explains the objectives of the study and the research question. It situates the
issue of youth and revolution in its larger context through a review of the literature. It
also presents a conceptual framework giving a brief overview of the three main social
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movements theories that the study applies: Resource Mobilization Theory, Political
Opportunity Structure and Framing. The conceptual framework also identifies and
problematizes the concepts of youth, “Revolutionary Youth” and “youthful
revolution” which will be utilized throughout the thesis. Finally, the chapter lays out
the methodology used as well as the challenges and limits of the study.
The second chapter explores the youth’s utilization of the different kinds of
resources available to them. Most importantly, it examines the modes of organization
in the post-Mubarak era. Using Resource Mobilization Theory, the chapter analyzes
the effect of the Egyptian revolution’s “leaderless-ness” on the organizational models
the different social movements adopted and the effect it had on their ability to
mobilize and gain popularity. In addition to organization and human resources
represented by leadership, moral, cultural and material resources are also examined.
Chapter three is interested in the political context affecting the youth’s
activism. More specifically, it looks at the institutional structures which facilitate or
constrain the youth’s realization of their goals. Applying Political Opportunity
Structure, this chapter identifies the opportunities the nature of the closed political
system and the state’s capacity for repression presented. While structures of the
political system imposed restrictions on youth’s access to formal politics, it provided
them an opportunity for mobilization. However, opportunities need to be perceived
and recognized to be considered opportunities.
In chapter four, the cultural context is examined to understand its effect on the
frames the youth used to appeal to the people. Based on the Framing approach, the
focus on agency is important to complement the previous chapter on institutional
structures. The chapter identifies the frames the youth used for identifying the
problem, proposing solutions and calling the people to action. It discusses the reasons
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for the failure of many of those frames to reach out to the people. Moreover, I will
assess counter-framing and frame contests which the youth have been engaged since
January 25th and the similarities and differences between their framing by the
different post-Mubarak regimes.
Finally, the conclusion argues for the importance of using a three dimensional
approach in studying youth movements. It highlights the thesis contribution to the
literature on youth movements and reveals the necessity for more specific studies
exploring the relationship between the youth and the revolutionary process.
1.4 Literature Review
1.4.1 Social Movements in Egypt
This study draws on a large literature on social movements and particularly
youth movements in Egypt and the Middle East. When applied to the Middle East,
Social Movement Theory (SMT) has most popularly been used to study modern
Islamic movements (e.g. Berna 2008; Donker 2013; Kayhan 2009; Munson 2001;
Shahin 1997, Wiktorowicz 2004; Zahedani 1997). More recently, it has also been
used to study workers movements in the region (Abdallah 2012; Beinin 2012; ElMahdi 2009). Since the January 25 Revolution, the role of youth as social movements
acquired more prominence and became the focus of study of many scholars from
various angles (Abdallah 2013; Cole 2014; Hoffman and Jamal 2012; Shehata 2012).
A number of social scientists observe the emergence of a new form of social
movements in the region (Abdelrahman 2013; Ezbawy 2012; Herrera 2014). Maha
Abdelrahman considers the nature of activism and revolutionary process in Egypt and
observes the characteristics of the New Social Movements (NSMs), arguing that the
lack of sustainable new organizational structures is one of the great challenges for real
revolutionary change in post-Mubarak Egypt. In her work “In Praise of Organization:
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Egypt between Activism and Revolution”, Abdelrahman makes the argument that the
very features of these movements, once credited for the success of the revolution, now
pose serious challenges for the post-Mubarak transformation.1
Examining the literature on youth movements in Egypt, three main features
become apparent. First, most of the major studies explore social movements in the
decade preceding the Egyptian Revolution leading up to January 25th (Abdelrahman
2014; El-Mahdi & Marfleet 2009; Beinin & Vairel 2013). They focus on the element
of continuity and argue that the roots of the revolution go deeper than what appears on
the surface. The revolution in their opinion was the culmination of a decade of civil
society’s activism in the form of pro-change movements, youth movements, workers
movements, and pro-democracy movements. Without the increasing pressure and
struggles of all those actors since the early 2000s, the revolution wouldn’t have been
possible. Maha Abdelrahman best expresses that argument by the very title of her
book Egypt's Long Revolution: Protest Movements and Uprisings. Moreover, she
postulates that the characteristics of these new social movements and their form of
political mobilization have helped shape the political process since the fall of
Mubarak. Rabab El-Mahdi refers to what is known in the literature as “cycles of
protest”, observing the array of different but complementary activities of pro-change
groups before the revolution.2 El-Mahdi utilizes the framework of social movements
to analyze the rise of pro-democracy movements preceding the 2005 referendum in
Egypt; however, she goes beyond the limitations of Opportunity Structure Model3 and
argues for looking closely at the “cycles of contentions that preceded it and energized

1

Maha Abdelrahman (2013, May). In Praise of Organization: Egypt Between Activism and
Revolution, Development and Change. 44 (3), 569–585.
2
Rabab El-Mahdi and Philip Marfleet (2009). Egypt: The Moment of Change. UK: Zed Books. 88.
3
In brief, the model focuses on fixed political structure e.g. nature of political system as the defining
factor in the success or failure of social movements. Opportunity structure model will be discussed in
detail in chapter 3.
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it through shared personnel and leadership … communities of protest … collectively
learned tactics, and through creation of space for overcoming ideological divisions”.4
Joel Beinin and Frederick Vairel agree with El-Mahdi in critiquing traditional
Social Movement Theory. They argue that traditional Political Opportunity Structures
(POS) understanding of contexts is narrow, fixed and objectivist. Contexts are never
equivalent and the wide discrepancies among authors on the list of variables that
represent “opportunities” testify to the limited explanatory claim of the model. 5
Beinin and Vairel observe that the same overly structural undertones are also present
in the use of collective frames and mobilizing paradigm where these frameworks are
regarded as pre-existing rather than dynamic processes constantly created and
developed by leaders and followers in a dialectical way. Going beyond the traditional
understanding of SMT, the authors redefine, modify and utilize with more nuances
analytical concepts and tools such as ‘informal networks’. The authors focus on three
axes: contexts, networks and contentious practices to answer the classical questions of
the contribution studying social movements in the Middle East and North Africa can
bring to mainstream social theory and also how these new insights enhance our
understanding of the region.6
Those studies’ story of social -and especially youth- movements in Egypt is
essentially one of success coroneted by the removal of Mubarak. Bearing in mind the
different approaches and arguments, the analysis is centered on the sources of
contention and the reasons for the emergence of protest movements. In the case of
Egypt, it stops at the significant moment of the January 25th Revolution eruption and

4

Ibid, 96.
Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel (Eds.) (2013). Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in
the Middle East and North Africa (2nd ed.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 6.
6
Ibid, 8.
5
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the transition of power to SCAF. The social and historical context they provide is
invaluable in understanding the later developments of those movements.
Second, the researchers who went beyond the analysis of the roots of youth
activism were preoccupied with the 18 days of Tahrir protest (Ezbawy 2012; Shahin
2012; Shehata 2012) Once again, the story projected is one of triumph that examines
the process of brining down an authoritarian regime. The questions asked have to do
with the reasons for their success in mobilization and organization and the dynamics
of contentious politics in a revolutionary context. Many of these studies, although
descriptive in nature, add important documentation to the literature and draw an
elaborate portrait of the movements participating in the January 25th protests that
could be used for further in-depth analysis.
For example, Yusery Ezbawy’s analysis concentrates on the elements of
organization and cooperation and how central they were in planning and carrying out
the revolution. He surveys the role of youth social movements in instigating the
January 25th Revolution and shows the connections between them. Using actor
network theory, Ezbawy explains how the absence of a revolutionary leadership was
dealt with by the youth through forming new connections (networks) by a series of
joint actions (demonstrations). 7 Tackling another aspect of social movement theory,
Ezbawy demonstrates how through choosing underdeveloped urban areas as starting
points for demonstrations on January 25th, youth movements were putting relative
depravity concept into action.8
Dina Shehata traces youth activism since the beginning and 2000s and
provides a useful account on the role of youth movements in January 25th. More
importantly, she identifies five characteristics unique to those movements: they act
7

Yusery Ahmed Ezbawy (2012). The Role of The Youth's New Protest Movements in The January
25th Revolution. IDS Bulletin, 43 (1), 26–36.
8
Ibid, 35.
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outside of parties and traditional organizations, they take place off-university campus,
they are non or trans-ideological, and they make extensive use of information
technology.9 Shehata’s account is informative and helps situate youth movements in
their historical context; however, further studies are needed to examine the
development of these characteristics in the post-Mubarak era and the extent of change
and appropriation that occurred to them.
Third, there is a disproportionate focus on the role of Facebook and social
media in instigating the Revolution and youth movement activities in the literature.
Many studies on youth and revolutionary movements in the Middle East accord social
media the primary role, giving the impression that the youth were able to change the
regime essentially through the use of technology. They highlight the role of the
Internet in the success of the revolution, the formation of new collective identity and
call by consequence to further utilization of social media (Baron 2012; Bliuc 2013;
Eltantawy & Wiest 2011). Some go as far as arguing that digital activism in Egypt
since the 1990s and blogging in particular (in combination with protest movements
and the press) are the root cause of the 2011 uprising (e.g. Faris 2012). However,
many authors also engage the topic more skeptically and point to the limitations of
using social media as the overarching framework of analysis (e.g. Sayed 2012; ElMahdi 2011). Others, taking a moderate position direct attention to often less-studied
aspects such as the difference between tactical and strategic uses of social media (e.g.
Gerbaudo 2012).
Focusing almost exclusively on the Facebook page ‘We are All Khaled Said’,
Linda Herrera traces its origins, and follows through the different phases of the page’s
developments as events unfold. However, Herrera asks larger questions on whether
9

Dina Shehata (2012). Youth Movements and the 25 January Revolution. In Korany, B. & El-Mahdi,
R. (Eds.) The Arab Spring in Egypt and Beyond. Cairo: AUC press. 104-124. 117-118.
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the balance of power could be shifted by the youth movements’ use of technology for
organization, expression, mobilization and discussion. Herrera explores how the
virtual world can transform into battle sites where the youth movements’ mastering of
technological tools is faced by increasingly efficient ways of monitoring, containing
and cooptation by more powerful entities using the same tools. The author seems to
conclude, however, that pro-democracy youth movements that are oriented towards
fighting corrupt and autocratic regimes remain at an advantage in the digital age.
Luis Fernando Baron tries to critically engage the debate on the “Facebook
Revolution” by prefacing that a careful consideration of youth organizations and
networks as well as larger history of social and protest movements in Egypt is
necessary to put things in context. Nevertheless, he makes the case that Informational
and Communication Technologies (ICTs) was not only essential in the formation of
the largest youth movement, April 6th, but it was also instrumental in “reporting,
framing, and discussing sociopolitical mobilization in Egypt”10 as well as calling for
action, organization and conduction of protests. Furthermore, ICTs represented a
space for youth political engagement and identification providing them with
alternative arenas of political debate and action. 11 An analysis shared by Nahed
Eltantawy and Julie B. Wiest who explore the use of social media by youth movement
during 2011 Revolution to reconsider the parameters of the Resource Mobilization
Theory. They argue that social media should be incorporated as an integral resource
for mobilization and organization in modern social movements.12

10

Luis Fernando Baron (2012). More Than a Facebook Revolution: Social Movements and Social
Media in the Egyptian Arab Spring. International Review of Information Ethics, 18, 86-92. 86
11
Ibid.
12
Nahed Eltantawy and Julie Wiest (2011) The Arab Spring| Social Media in the Egyptian Revolution:
Reconsidering Resource Mobilization Theory. International Journal Of Communication. 5 Feature
1207–1224.
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Aouragh and Alexander (2011) attempt to offer an understanding of the
dialectical relationship between the online and offline political activity. They hold
that the two cannot have meaning or be understood in isolation from one another.
However, they make the salient argument that Twitter and Facebook, commonly
referred to as social networks, are in fact not social networks but social tools; the
people are the social network.13 In contradiction to Baron who perceived social media
as having a decisive role in the creation, sustainability and development of April 6th
Youth Movement and increasing the “size, speed and reach of activism” at large,
Aouragh and Alexander consider social media only as a medium that provided
alternative mechanism to spread the message.
Using Framing, one of social movements paradigms, Manaf Bashir analyzes
the portrayal of online activism by youth movements. Taking the case study of April
6th Youth Movement, he concludes that the movement’s leaders and participants’
performance of the three social movements framing tasks (i.e. diagnostic, prognostic,
and motivational frames) were similar. The significance of this study lies in offering
possibilities for a better understanding of diverse frames used by leaders and
participants of youth movements especially as the latter are gaining more agency.
The focus on the online aspect particularly the use of technology and social
media in social movement mobilization and development and also in the formation of
ideas and identities is definitely important. However, that analysis ignores other
important aspects and neglects the fact that those who have no access to the Internet
are the majority in the country. Also drawing a direct causal relationship between
Facebook and the Egyptian Revolution is reductionist if not overly naïve. In Herrera’s
words “Facebook is no more responsible for Egypt’s revolution than Gutenberg’s
13

Miriyam Aouragh and Anne Alexander (2011). The Arab Spring| The Egyptian Experience: Sense
and Nonsense of the Internet Revolution”. International Journal of Communication, 5. 1351

20

printing press with movable type was responsible for the Protestant Reformation in
the fifteenth century”14. Similarly, the role of the Internet and online media in shaping
and shifting the political consciousness of this generation is worthy of consideration
but is at many times exaggerated.15
It is worth mentioning that the Arabic literature by and large, in contradiction
to my expectations, proved to be of secondary use. This could be due to the fact that
the majority of prominent Egyptian scholars in political science and sociology opt to
write in English. In any case, many of the academic studies in Arabic I examined
were in great part descriptive and at many times lacked an argument. Others were too
absorbed in details while the majority were of a journalistic nature providing a lot of
valid ideas but often lacking clear theoretical frameworks. Exceptions to this, which
turned out to be useful, include Arab Forum for Alternatives studies, in particular
George Fahmi’s paper “Youth Movements Post January 25th”, Omar Khalaf’s “Youth
Political Participation after the Revolution” and the collective work “Untraditional
Patterns of Youth Political Participation Before, During and After the Revolution”.
As can be noticed from this brief literature overview, youth movements in
Egypt have been studied extensively from various perspectives. There is need to
extend the research in terms of timeframe to cover Mohamed Morsi and Abdel Fattah
al-Sisi presidencies which are often missing from the analyses. It is also timely that
research goes beyond the utopic experience of Tahrir and pose new questions with
regard to the role of youth movements in post-revolutionary/ transitional periods, the
transition from the revolutionary to the political and the changes occurring to the
movements in the process in terms of structures, ideas, strategies and tactics.
14

Linda Herrera (2012) Revolution 2.0: The Facebook Factor. In Haddad, B., Bsheer, R., & Abu-Rish,
Z., (Eds.) The dawn of the Arab uprisings: End of an old order? London, UK: Pluto Press. 91.
15
For example see McGarty, C., Thomas, E. F., Lala, G., Smith, L. G. E. and Bliuc, A. M. (2014), New
Technologies, New Identities, and the Growth of Mass Opposition in The Arab Spring. Political
Psychology, 35: 725–740.
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Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly’s chapter on contentious
politics, of which social movement is the most studied form, summarizes the major
debates, approaches, and theories regarding social movements. Written in 2009 based
on and referencing the famous trio’s work over the three preceding decades, that
chapter does a remarkable job contextualizing the different concepts related to
contentious politics, social movements processes, dynamics, and problematiques. The
authors survey the development of the field since the 1960s when studying
contentious politics first became popular among American and later on European
scholars. In their survey, the three sociologists highlight the three main trends within
social movement theory: Political Process Model, Resource Mobilization, and
Framing reflecting the structural, rational and constructivist approaches respectively.
This will be explained in more details in the theoretical framework.
1.4.2 Significance of the study
This thesis will add to the literature in a number of ways. First, it builds on the
already established work on social movements before the Egyptian Revolution to
present the journey of the youth post-the revolution. It will fill a gap in the literature
concerning the relationship between the youthful and the revolutionary.
Second, it will assess the applicability and usefulness of the use of models
such as SMT and NSMs to understand and analyze youth movements in Egypt. Using
social movements theory to study the youth in post-revolution Egypt, this study posits
new horizons for developing the theory to suit revolutionary situations and suggests
prospects for including different factors of analysis specific to each case.
Third, the mapping of youth's political activity across the four years since the
revolution is an endeavor that has not been exhaustively taken before. This research
will present a valuable addition in presenting a comprehensive overview both in terms
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of scope of actors and the timeframe covered to help future researchers studying the
Egyptian youth.
Fourth, this study, using youth as a category of social analysis, strikes a
balance between acknowledging the differences between the youth groups and not
dealing with them as one homogeneous group and at the same time observing the
common characteristics and patterns. My research allows for a flexible application of
social movement theory that takes into action the nature of the political and cultural
context in Egypt. I acknowledge the useful tools and concepts the theory offers in
analysis yet I make sure they serve the purpose of direction not determination.
1.5 Conceptual Framework
1.5.1 Social Movement Theories
This research utilizes social movements theory as the main framework of
analysis. In this section I will go briefly over the definition of social movement and
the main theoretical tenants I will depend on. Specific variables of analysis will be
discussed in each chapter more elaborately. Social movements is a term widely used
to cover “most or all of the overlap between contention and collective action.” 16 It
falls under the more general field of contentious politics, which has acquired
prominence since the 1990s. The hallmark of contentious politics is common people’s
ability to exert power by disruptive means setting in motion important political and
social changes. 17 Contentious politics happens when “ordinary people – often in
alliance with more influential citizens and with changes in the public mood – join
forces in confrontation with the elites, authorities and opponents”.18

16

Doug McAdam, Sydney Tarrow & Charles Tilly (2009). Comparative Perspectives on Contentious
Politics. In Lichbach, M. I. & Zuckerman, A. S. (Eds.) Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture,
and Structure (2nd ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press. 277.
17
Sidney G. Tarrow (2011) Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics.
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Social movements is one form of contentious politics (perhaps the most
studied), however, it has certain characteristics that differentiate it from other forms
of contention such as civil wars. At the core of social movement is contentious
collective action. Collective action becomes contentious when it is used by people
with no consistent access to representative institutions who act on behalf of new or
unaccepted claims behaving in a way that essentially challenges their opponents
(usually the state).19
According to Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, there are three defining
features to social movements: 1) “sustained campaigns of claim making”, and 2) “an
array of public performances”. These include public meetings and statements,
demonstrations, rallies, letter writing, press releases and lobbying. 3) And finally
“repeated public display of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment” (WUNC).
This is done through wearing certain colors, chanting slogans, carrying signs, among
others. 20 Donatella Della Porta, and Mario Diani identify four features for social
movements: 1) They have informal interactions networks “between a plurality of
individuals, groups and organizations”, which can range between being loosely
organized and dispersed to being highly organized21; 2) collective identity which is
displayed through having common beliefs and solidarity; 3) “collective action
focusing on conflict”, 4) finally, protest is used by social movements as a form of
action.22 The combination of these four factors results in forming social movements.
After half of a century of theorizing social movements, three approaches have
consolidated their presence in the field. None can be used independently to explain
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social movements. In this study, I build on previous scholars’ efforts to synthesize and
combine elements from each theoretical approach to study youth movements in
Egypt.
The first strand of theories reflecting a rational choice model can be grouped
under the Resource Mobilization Theory, which focuses on motivations that
encourage or discourage popular mobilization and collective action. Appearing in the
1960s, this perspective essentially developed from the field of economics. The
American economist Mancur Olson is one pioneer of this approach whose work on
collective action focused on the reasons people de-mobilize rather than mobilize.23
Olson argues that individuals based on rational choice may very well avoid taking
action when they perceive others as doing so on their behalf. This puzzle known as
the free rider dilemma was later specified by Mark Lichback as “the rebel’s
dilemma”.24 It became the subject of study by social movements scholars ever since.
John McCarthey and Mayer Zald introduced a theory that focuses on professional
movement organizations in response to Olson. Emphasizing the leadership aspect and
shifting away from the effect of grievances on collective action, the theory posits that
the success of social movements depends on their ability to make use of resources
through organizational means.25 These resources are not limited to material ones but
include human, moral, socio-organizational and cultural resources.26
Based on the fact that social movements do not operate in a vacuum, a second
approach concerned with exogenous factors and the context within which social
movements act developed. Political Opportunity Structure reflects the structural
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paradigm perceiving collective action as both a response and an influence on
institutional politics. 27 Based on several scholars’ conceptions of dimensions of
political opportunity,28 four factors relating to the environment affect the movement’s
ability to mobilize can be summarized: 1) openness/closeness of the regime 2)
stability of political alignments 3) presence/absence of elite allies 4) the state’s
capacity for repression.29 Similarly, there is no agreement among scholars regarding
the variables that constitute “opportunities” to explain the effects of the same context
on different movements. In his comparative article, Marco Giugni presents four kinds
of opportunities that deserve special attention: discursive opportunities, specific
opportunities, perceived opportunities and the shift from conditions to mechanisms.30
The political process model contrary to what the name suggests does not provide
specific mechanisms to study the process of contention. Each scholar presents a
different set of variables. It has to be used with other elements of social theory to be
able to connect different aspects of the model to one another.
The third major paradigm is constructivism reflected in Framing Process and
drawing on older collective behavior approach and culture analysis31. Framing refers
to the social movement’s construction of meaning by creating an “interpretative
scheme” 32 that simplifies the world and assign meaning (frame) to itself, events and
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opponents to mobilize supporters.33 David Snow, Donatella Della Porta, and Robert
Benford are among the pioneers of that theory. With its focus on the construction of
meaning and the role of ideas in sustaining a movement and its chances of success,
framing processes theory completes the triangle for understanding social movements.
1.5.2 The Definition of Youth
Youth is often defined in biological terms comprising different age ranges
according to the entity issuing the definition. For example, in Egypt the Central
Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) defines the youth as those
between the ages of 18-29 while the UN defines them as those between 15-24.34 The
African Youth Charter, on the other hand, defines youth as anyone between the ages
15-35. 35 Although these are all valid definitions of the youth, none of them is
exclusively used in this research 36 . Instead of focusing solely on the age-based
definitions, I deal with youth as a social construct that provides more room for
understanding the dynamics that exceeds the boundaries of age and delve into the
realm of ideas, habitus, and expressions. Indeed, there is an important biological
aspect that could not be overlooked; however, the concept is more comprehensive and
lucid to be restricted in fixed ages. Asef Bayat goes as far as arguing that young
people are not by default “youth”. Rather, they become youth as a social category that
is turning into social actors.37 This is based on his argument that youth is mainly a
modern and urban social construct owing to the mass education, mass media and
33
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urban public spaces.38 In Egypt, a phenomenon such as ‘marriage waithood’ imposes
on many youth an “extension of their youth” as their transition to adulthood by
marriage is postponed.39
In Egypt, those between the ages 18-29 according to CAPMAS’s most recent
statistics, constitutes around twenty millions Egyptians, half of whom are under the
poverty line.40 This latter part of the information is essential because in talking about
the revolutionary youth, analysts and commentators often overlook the fact that half
of them are hardly if ever represented in political movements and parties. The
Egyptian youth had ample reasons to participate in the revolution. As previously
mentioned, Egypt is a very young country with 24 as the median age, meaning that
half the population is under 24. Politically and economically, the youth suffered from
exclusion. Additionally, the youth carried the brunt of unemployment. According to
CAPMAS 70.8% of the unemployed in Egypt are youth under the age of 29.
Moreover, with regard to the level of education, 84.5% of the unemployed held high
school and college degrees.41 Youth have the highest stakes in democratic transition
as they have the future ahead of them and a life to look forward to. With high level of
education and exposure, the youth’s expectations increased and consequently their
frustrations with the realities in Egypt.
1.5.3 “Revolutionary Youth”
The term “Revolutionary Youth” is a complex term that has no single
definition. Over the past four years, it has been used and misused in different contexts
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for various intentions by different actors. While some believe there is no such thing as
“Revolutionary Youth” and that this is simply a media creation that perceived in the
“Facebook urban middle class educated youth” a presentable model for a peaceful and
civilized revolution; others believe there is no escape from the fact there existed a
solid core of youth activists whose role has been essential for the revolution and by
sharing certain characteristics can be considered a social category.
In this research I examine those youth who took part in the planning of the
revolution, actively participated in it and remained politically or civically engaged
throughout the post- Mubarak period. Shabab Al-Thawra, literally translated to “the
youth of the revolution”, presents a more accurate depiction of the concept than
“Revolutionary Youth”, which confers a revolutionary quality that may be contested.
However, since the term “Revolutionary Youth” is commonly used in the media and
scholarly studies, I will use it in this research to maintain consistency. At many times,
I simply use the term “youth” for the sake of simplicity.
Many studies on the topic in Egypt deal with the youth as one homogenous
group that act with the same mindset. They tend to focus on the role the youth played
in organizing the revolution, often romanticizing it and falling into a lot of
generalizations. In this research, I try to deal with revolutionary youth as a social
group sharing many common features and aspirations for the future while
acknowledging their different articulations of their demands and visions for the
country. While it is important to note the role the youth have played in the revolution,
it is equally important not to fall into the traps of oversimplification and idealizing of
the notion. In my analysis, I deal with Revolutionary Youth as a social movement that
encompasses many Social Movement Organizations (SMOs). Put differently,
Revolutionary Youth is considered the social umbrella advocating for change. Entities
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such as Revolution Youth Coalition, 6th of April, Revolutionary Socialists, We are All
Khaled Said, and others are considered different SMOs –“formal organizations that
take the collective pursuit of social change as a primary goal”. 42 This allows for a
two-level analysis that avoids getting consumed in specificities or over generalizing.
1.5.4 Youthful Revolution
The role of youth in revolutions is not something new or unique to the
Egyptian case. Historically, in revolutions, youth often were the majority of
participants for reasons having to do with physical ability and having fewer
responsibilities. So why is it then that the Egyptian Revolution has been called a
“youth revolution” before the “popular revolution” narrative became mainstream?
The issue is not just one of numbers. The mere large participation of youth does not
make the Egyptian revolution a youth revolution. Instead of defining a movement
according to the age of its participants and the identity of its actors at large, scholars
like Asef Bayat advocate that it is the nature of demands and the causes adopted by
the movement which define its nature.43 The fact that the youth were at the core of the
revolution as youth gave the struggle a generational dimension that could not be
overlooked. While “youth” refers to an age range, “youthful” refers to the attributes
and features associated with that phase of being young.44 Age is an important factor
but the choices and demands informed by that age are equally important. As one
activist noted: “It is a generational struggle but on the level of ideas as well and not
only age”.45 It is a struggle between the old and the new, the conventional and the
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innovative, the past and the future. To be revolutionary even if one did not belong to
the youth age range meant to be youthful on some level.46
“Youthfulness” has been a quality painting the Egyptian Revolution, the
actors and the discourse involved. Even the traditional players had to engage with the
youth discourse and adapt their rhetoric and tools to keep up with the changing
developments and look “younger”.47 The youthful character of the revolution imposed
itself as an authentic part of the political equation that had to be contended with. The
effects of the Egyptian Revolution on social media are beyond the scope of this study
but it is one manifestation of how the youth were able to establish new ways of
communication and practicing journalism as realities in the Egyptian context. In brief,
the purpose of this section was to argue for the importance of including youth and
youthfulness as useful factors in analyzing revolutionary activities.
1.6 Methodology
1.6.1 Interviews
This research takes a qualitative socio-political approach using a variety of
primary and secondary sources to analyze the demise of youth as political actors.
Depending on interviews, I conducted 14 in-depth semi-structured interviews with
members from a variety of youth movements as well as many other informal
discussions and conversations 48 . I do not claim nor do I aim to present a
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representative sample of the youth. This study is by no way intended to be an
ethnography; rather, the interviews are used as additional primary sources to
substantiate the arguments made. I am aware of the inherent bias in my research
towards the urban educated middle class youth being more accessible and within my
circle of acquaintances. However, the aim of those interviews is to show the diversity
of political background and action among some of the youth who acquired leadership
positions in their movements over the past four years since the revolution and came to
be known as “Revolutionary Youth”.
Although it is impossible and probably counterproductive in a study with such
scope to cover all youth movements, initiatives, groups and entities, I tried to be as
diverse as possible by interviewing youth from the most active and effective youth
social movements, political parties as well as independent activists. This included
current and former youth members from: April 6 Movement Masr Al-Qawiya, AlTayyar Al-Masry, Al-Dostour, Revolution Youth Coalition, Revolutionary Socialists,
Revolution Path Front (Thowar), and unaffiliated youth.
At each phase of the transitional period, certain youth entities arose on the
political scene and acquired prominence. For example, during the SCAF's time, the
Revolution Youth Coalition was the first attempt at youth unification and creating a
unified front and for a year and a half it was regarded by some as the representative of
the revolution. During Sisi's rule many new groups appeared such as Revolution Path
Front. These two groups as examples of youth’s unification endeavors as well as other
actors will be referred to throughout the analysis whenever appropriate.
The interviews were conducted over the summer and fall of 2014. As I have
been fairly active myself within different circles of activists and kept close ties with
different initiatives and movements since January 25 Revolution, I believe this
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provided an element of trust, making my job smoother and more productive. Some of
the youth I interviewed had to leave the country in fear for their safety. In that case,
Skype interviews were used.
1.6.2 Other Primary and Secondary Sources
Given the youthful nature of the topic, a lot of useful material could be found
in informal websites and blogs, I did my best to cite all sources whenever possible.
Since all youth movements have constantly up to date Facebook pages, this
constituted a major primary source I referred to for specific statements and
articulation of positions. In addition, being a native Arabic speaker allowed me to
follow official and local independent newspapers for data and a variety of views. This
is in addition to scholarly articles and books, especially for the theoretical framework.
1.6.3 Challenges and Opportunities
There are a number of challenges in a study of this sort. First, the events in
Egypt are still unfolding and the political scene is pretty much fluid and in constant
flux. Although the study is time bound, the ongoing events affect the analysis of the
past period and necessitates continuous development of approach to set things in
perspective. Attempting to engage a topic so contemporary feels like constantly trying
to shoot a moving target. Nevertheless, the timeliness of the topic adds more value to
the study and can help direct future research.
Second, being part of the youth myself and being engaged and greatly invested
in the topic is something that cannot be overlooked. In fact, an essential component to
the thesis is the personal motivation behind it. However, being aware of my inherit
bias, I am able to recognize the shortcomings of my own analysis and turn this
challenge into an opportunity for a more in touch with the ground study. In fact, more
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studies are needed from young activists/scholars who could add to the theoretical
discussions an insider perspective as well as a passionate and critical self-evaluation.
Third, many of the concepts employed throughout the thesis are of arbitrary
and controversial nature. The definition and conception of youth itself the main
concept of this research is a task that could merit a study on its own. The same could
be said about the revolutionary. Nevertheless, it is by engaging with these concepts
that a better and more nuanced understandings could be developed. This challenge
may actually be an opportunity for suggesting new conceptions for understanding
taken-for-granted categories.
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Chapter 2: In search of Organization
"Those who want liberty must organize as effectively as those who want tyranny."
Iyad al-Baghdadi, an Arab activist
2.1 Introduction
Using John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald’s comprehensive definition of
social movements as “a set of preferences for social change within a population”49,
revolutionary youth in Egypt constitute a social movement. By revolutionary youth I
mean those youth who took part in the preparation and implementation of the
demonstrations on January 25th and continued to believe and strive for the ideals of
the revolution
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. But because those youth are diverse and have different

interpretations of what “bread, freedom and social justice” mean in action, it is
indispensible to study another closely related concept – social movement
organizations (SMOs). SMOs are “named” groups that seek to realize the social
change goals of the social movement using various tactics and strategies. 51 The
distinction between these two concepts SM and SMOs is important to avoid
generalizations, or even romanticization of the youth potential and at the same to
allow for the possibility of understanding and assessing their activities realistically. In
other words, what this thesis seeks to achieve is a balanced analysis that
acknowledges the youth’s heterogeneity while observing the common features they
exhibit and the similar challenges they face as one group sharing the same formative
experiences.52
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This thesis starts with the premise that revolutionary movement cannot be
adequately understood without taking into account the generational aspect.
Understanding revolutionary movements essentially as manifestations of youth
activities, this chapter delves into the first factor in analyzing youth’s demising role
from the forefront to the margins – resources.
2.2 Resource Mobilization Theory
Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) is one approach in Social Movement
Theory (SMT) focusing on the importance of resources in the development and
success of social movements. The theory posits that the available form of resources
shapes the movement’s development and that the ability to utilize it determines the
movement’s success. Because of the basic premise of RMT, many studies utilize
resources as a primary factor in understanding the emergence, development and
success of a social movement or social movement organization but without
specifically referencing the approach. This is due to the fact that the main concepts
and principles of the theory have been so mainstreamed and internalized in the
literature that they have become “taken for granted”53. However, a careful application
of the theory can provide useful insights into the processes of social movements.
Influenced by economics, social theorists, for a long time, have dealt with
resources as being mainly financial or material ones. Others critiqued the model for
considering ‘everything a resource’. 54 Understanding the nature of resources is
essential before determining their use-value to social movements and the extent to
the local level the 2005 presidential elections and the 2010 parliamentary elections are two other
events. For more details see Strauss and Howe, Generations. 1991.
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which access to them could be controlled. 55 In this chapter, I follow a fivefold
typology developed by Edwards and McCarthy’s, consisting of human, socialorganizational, moral, cultural, and material resources56 to analyze Egyptian youth’s
resource mobilization experience over the past four years.
Human resources constitute a tangible category comprising labor, experience
and skills. For the expertise and skills of the members to be of added value they have
to fit the movement or organization’s needs. Leadership is an important component
included in this category as it combines more than one human resource. The effect of
leadership could be tremendous on the movement or the organization determining its
success or failure. In the light of the leaderless-ness of the Egyptian Revolution with
its ensuing consequences, human resources will be given special attention in analysis.
The second type of resources is social-organizational resources. This category
includes intentional social organization created specifically to advance the goals of
the movement as well as appropriable organizations created as nonmovements with
actors using them to access other types of resources.57 Social organizational resources
take three general forms: infrastructures, social networks, and organizations. Access
to these resources obviously varies with infrastructures being nonproprietary social
resources. The two other resources will be carefully analyzed further on to explain the
youth’s inability to penetrate state organizations.
Legitimacy is the most studied form of moral resources. However, moral
resources also include the support and sympathy of the people and celebrity figures.
These forms of resources tend to develop outside the social movement or organization
and are conferred by an external actor. Therefore, they can be considered less
accessible and more proprietary than other resources. This could be observed in youth
55

Ibid, 116.
Ibid, 116.
57
Ibid, 127.
56

37

political parties created after the presidential elections in Egypt such as Masr AlQawiya, Al-Dostour and Al-Tayyar Al-Sha`abi, which sought to make use of the
celebrity figures Abdelmoneim Aboul Fotouh, Mohamed AlBaradei, and Hamdeen
Sabahi respectively to gain legitimacy.
The way Edwards and McCarthy define cultural resources, as cultural
products that include specialized knowledge and conceptual tools, emphasizes their
relative and context-specific quality. Among the cultural resources according to them
is “tacit knowledge about how to accomplish specific tasks like enacting a protest
event, holding a news conference, running a meeting, forming an organization,
initiating a festival, or surfing the web.”58 These resources are not universal.
Finally, material resources are the most tangible and analytically studied
resources. They combine physical and financial capital most notably money. Money
is definitely important for the sustainability of social movements and organizations,
Youth movements in Egypt have proved successful in bringing down Mubarak’s
regime with very few monetary resources available. However, the same could not be
said about the youth partisan experience, which failed to a great extent because of
lack of funds.
It is worth noting that the mere presence of these resources does not
automatically make them available to potential social actors. For resources to be
useful, they have to be both present in a specific socio-historical context and to be
accessible to those actors. Resources also vary spatially and geographically with
crucial resources concentrating more at the core than at the periphery. This leads
theorists to expect mobilization to correlate more strongly with the availability of
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resources rather than with the geographic distribution of grievances or injustices59.
This could be observed in the Egyptian revolution where mobilization did not occur
mainly in Upper Egypt although it suffered more significantly from injustice and
marginalization and instead took place in urban Cairo and the Delta.
There are various mechanisms to access these resources. Four main
mechanisms

are

essential:

Aggregation,

self-production,

appropriation

and

patronage. 60 Aggregation refers to the ways an SMO harnesses the resources by
converting resources held by individuals to collective resources that could be utilized
by the organization. This could include aggregating monetary resources held by
others through the form of donations or aggregating moral resources by producing
and publicizing lists of endorsements by public figures, for example. Self-production
is the second mechanism by which movements can secure resources. As the name
indicates, it is an essential mechanism to generate resources for any movement as it
depends on its own members in producing them. Appropriation concerns the ways a
movement can make use of previously aggregated resources by other organizations. It
is important to note once more that these sources need not to be material. It could also
refer to the cooptation of discourse, social networks or moral authority. 61 Finally,
patronage is the gaining of access to resources through a “sponsoring” organization or
person. Its most common form is financial patronage whereby an organization
specialized in patronage (e.g. foundation grant) would provide an SMO with
necessary money for their activities. In Egypt, youth movements used a combination
of those mechanisms to acquire resources relying primarily on aggregation and selfproduction. Monetary patronage relationships proved to be the most difficult to
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secure, as youth’s goals were often at odd with the successive regimes following
Mubarak while local NGOs support was modest given their limit capacity.
This chapter will apply the five types of resources on revolution youth with
focus on human resources and social-organizational resources. Other resources will
also be examined briefly. The main part of the chapter, interested in the question of
organization, will explore the youth’s organizational dilemma to understand its effect
on the mobilization of the other resources and provide one explanation of why some
youth movements were more successful in developing sustainable and effective
organizations than others. It also explains why the youth as a whole were unable to
organize effectively.
In this regard, this chapter studies organizational structure and leadership not
only as resources themselves but more importantly it considers them the lens through
which the utilization of other resources can be analyzed. This is in accordance with a
large body of literature interested in the creation and characteristics of SMOs using
resources in combination with the two other analytical tools: frames and political
opportunity.62
2.3 Human Resources
2.3.1 Leadership
Leadership is one of the most studied forms of human resources for it
combines a number of human resources such as skills and experience. It is also
important because it directly affects the mobilization of other resources. One of the
most significant features of the Egyptian revolution is that it was a leaderless one, at
least in the traditional sense. ‘The multitude’ to use political philosophers Michael
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Hardt and Antonio Negri’s expression, was able to organize itself without a center. 63
Social media tools were expressions of that new organizational structure that enabled
autonomous forms of getting together. Many argue, and perhaps rightly so, that the
revolution did not succeed, despite having a leader, but in fact because it didn’t have a
leader.64 Having no leader meant the movement could not be co-opted or pre-empted.
The regime could not target its leaders by killing, imprisonment or striking a deal.
The Egyptian Revolution had no proclaimed leaders, nor a clear organizational
structure. It was a fluid body that posed an unprecedented threat the regime did not
know how to handle. Hierarchical structures such as governments are most familiar
confronting structures of the same nature. Leaderless networks of actions, developed
in response to the inefficient over hierarchical traditional political structures,
constituted a new challenge they simply had no tools to manage.
This leaderless-ness, however, could not sustain for a long time once Mubarak
was deposed. The first dilemma it posed in the Egyptian context is the issue of
representation. Who gets to represent the youth or the revolution for that matter?
When Mubarak fell on February 11, 2011, both the SCAF and the Muslim
Brotherhood drew on their large organizational skills and structures, while the
revolutionary youth began to create numerous coalitions and revolutionary networks
with the attempt of representing the millions of youth who protested against Mubarak
and negotiate on their behalf. The phase between the fall of Mubarak and the election
of the first civilian President Mohammed Morsi in 2012 saw the proliferation of
coalitions, movements, initiatives and campaigns. The first coalition to be created was
the Revolution Youth Coalition (RYC). Shortly after its creation, a state of chaos
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emerged and dozens of coalitions were founded. As a result, April 6th left the
coalition in April 2011 and began engaging with other coalitions in accordance with
the new reality; it no longer has any links with the Revolution Youth Coalition.65
Throughout the first transitional period (February 2011 – June 2012), the
media played a significant role in presenting some youth as “representative” of the
revolution. While some of those youth, such as Wael Ghonim, repeatedly rejected
being labeled a leader or hailed as a hero66, others were seduced by media lights and
fame started acting accordingly. This led to inciting jealousy between youth leaders in
their own organizations. Increasing internal disputes in the RYC centering on issues
of representation, management and strategies led the coalition to announce its
disbandment in July 2012 following the election of President Mohammed Morsi.
The lack of leadership stemmed from a structural reason that has to do with
the fact that the youth who ignited the revolution did not belong to one social group
with a coherent structure or ideological orientation. No ‘revolutionary vanguard’ took
charge because no one was actually prepared for a revolution. The second reason is a
more philosophical one. Some analysts observe that since its onset the revolution was
resistant to all representations attempts. There was an inherent antagonism against the
idea of control and leadership. Realizing their power for the first time, the masses
opted for self-representation while the regime on the other hand sought to “create a
head for the revolution” so it can negotiate with.67 This revolution had no head, but
that doesn’t mean it had no mind as El-Raggal rightly pointed. The ‘new multitude’ in
Egypt appeared in objection to the failure of political parties and traditional
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organizations to effect change and win its battle against the regime. 68 Instead of
dealing in terms of leaderless-ness, perhaps what the Egyptian Revolution experience
presented was a ‘leaderful’ model where by their spontaneous participation, everyone
got to be a leader.69
In conclusion, leadership is regarded in RMT as an important resource
because of its great use in harnessing other types of resources. The Egyptian
revolution proved that leaderless-ness could have its great advantages in protest
settings while the transitional period has proved that the absence of representation
leads to possible loss of victories achieved.

With the collapse of the nascent

democratic path and the ineffectiveness of political parties post June 30th, some are
arguing that those circumstances necessitate concentrating efforts on building
leaderless network-based groups once again to resist the current regime. Leaders in
this context could become a liability rather than a resource as they could be easily
targeted thus limiting the effectiveness of the movements. However, the question of
representation still persists and remains unresolved. Leaderless movements could be
effective in bringing about positive outcomes up to a certain point but once the regime
collapses, those entities ready with leaders and organized structures will be the ones
assuming the center stage to fill out the power vacuum while leaderless movements
will remain in the opposition seat, at best.
2.3.2. Experience
The problem with the revolution is that “we participated in the revolution
without knowing what a revolution is” Ahmed Abdel Gawad, an ex Muslim
Brotherhood member and the former Secretary General of Masr Al-Qawiya
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confirmed70. What Abdel Gawad is referring to is an essential factor in understanding
the organizational failure of the youth to mobilize support in the post-Mubarak era.
The revolutionaries became revolutionaries after the revolution. They had no prior
ideas on what to do once the regime has fell. Living for 30 years under Mubarak rule,
they never entertained the thought that there could come the day where the regime
would collapse and they would be asked to present alternatives. Here the generational
dimension is important to put things in context. The youth, in contrast to other actors,
did not have an organizational legacy they could build on. All of sudden their status
as protestors was changed to that of revolutionaries without knowing what that
exactly entails.
One factor that should be analyzed is the youth’s organizational experience (or
lack therefore). The organizational deficiency noticed in youth groups emerging in the
post-Mubarak era can be explained in part by their organizational experience, which
led many of them to engage in fluid informal and network-based types of
organization. Youth engaging in politics in post-Mubarak era came from three main
organizational experiences: the first group had no prior political organizational
training and their experience did not exceed civil-society activities basically focused
on charity and development. The second group’s experience was one of protest. This
culminated in the 2000s decade with many unaffiliated youth becoming more engaged
in blogging and in protest. The third group includes those who came from closed and
highly structured organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Their experience
with the lack of transparency and internal democracy in the MB made them resistant
to hierarchical structures.71 The organizational choices of those three groups can be
clearly observed in the post Mubarak scene. The first group was dispersed among the
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different initiatives and informal networks created throughout the revolution. Groups
such as the Revolutionary Socialists continued their protest strategy not only because
of their previous experience under Mubarak rule but simply because it was the only
weapon they knew how to use. The ex-Muslim Brotherhood members tried to
establish decentralized models to evade the shortcomings they suffered from in the
MB model. The experience of establishing the two parties Al-Tayyar Al-Masry and
Masr Al-Qawiya are cases in point.
2.3.3. Expertise
In addition to experience, political expertise is another resource the youth
lacked. Here the experience of the Revolution Youth Coalition merits some analysis.
As aforementioned, being the first attempt at youth unification, the RYC was
established in February 2011 during the January 25th uprising. By the election of a
new president in July 2012, the RYC announced it has fulfilled its duty for that phase
and consequently its disbandment 72 . In a rare practice in Egyptian politics, the
coalition published on its Facebook page an account of its accomplishments and
shortcomings over the period of a year and a half. The coalition apologized to the
revolution youth and to the people for what seemed at times as monopolizing talking
about the revolution. Furthermore, it admitted that in fear of penetration it closed
down shop and was not successful in reaching out to wider revolutionary forces
calling it “an unjustifiable and serious mistake.”73 Some considered the RYC’s real
problem is that they were not qualified for the responsibility entrusted upon them.
Ahmed Adel, who was close to the RYC experience, was quickly to acknowledge that
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but he also pointed out that to be fair this is a problem of the youth in general. They
were subjected to a process of “intellectual bulldozing” over the years. Only a
minority had the skills and capabilities to lead.74 Expecting that much of the youth,
especially at a moment when no one was prepared at would be asking too much of
them.
The youth tried to capitalize on their technical expertise through the use of
online media as a platform for direct democracy. The RYC often used its 220+
thousands of fans Facebook page in asking people to take part in naming the weekly
Friday million-man marches, a hallmark of that period. The famous “We are all
Khaled Said” page, the largest revolutionary Facebook page with more than 4 million
fans often conducted polls during the first transitional period and Morsi’s presidency
to include the voices of the youth to direct political action. This technical expertise
was a resource that gave the youth advantage over other political actors who were
forced to enter the Facebook world to adapt to the new realties of the political scene.
As the reliance on social media became a feature of all political activities in the postMubarak period, Della Porta and Mosca make the argument that the use of internetbased communication can be considered a new type of resource utilized by “resource
poor” social movements for it presents means for mass communication which was not
possible before due to financial, spacial or temporal limitations.75 Interestingly, this
technical know-how, gave the youth activists access to more resources by allowing
them to exchange experiences with activists around the world.
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2.4 Social-Organizational Resources
Youth’s inherent skepticism if not outright opposition to vertical modes of
organization, stemming from decades of suffering under authoritarian rule, has
governed much of their organizational experience eventually leading to their
fragmentation. The inability of the youth to develop an organizational model that
would maintain flexibility and mass democracy and at the same time provide structure
and tools of effective mobilization was one of the biggest setbacks to maintaining
political clout.
Essential to understanding the revolutionaries’ models of organization is
capturing their conception of power which drives their strategy and choices.
According to Bill Moyer there are two conceptions of power: elite power and people
power. In the elite power model, the belief is that the elite at the top of the power
triangle that control the society through the government and the market are what
matters. All efforts are geared toward those power holders in an attempt to persuade
or force them to change or implement policies. The people power model on the other
hand places emphasis on the masses believing it is there that true power lies. 76
Obviously, the revolutionary movement is built on the people power model. Wael
Ghonim, the Google marketing executive and one of the leading icons of the Egyptian
Revolution, explicitly makes this case by the very title of his book documenting his
experience with the Egyptian Revolution. The book’s title is Revolution 2.0: The
Power of the People is Greater than People in Power. By 2.0 Ghonim is referring to
the digital quality of the revolution likening it to Wikipedia where everyone
contributes content but no one knows the name of the contributors. This gives the
people enormous advantage facing “people in power”. The power of the collective
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when centered around one goal can defeat the regime in power no matter how strong,
Ghonim contends throughout his book.
Many of the revolutionary youth did not seek to assume “power” because they
believed power to be in the hands of the people in the first place. Instead, they sought
to empower people to be able to create their own alternatives and exert pressure on
the regime to succumb to their demands. In my extended interview with him, Hany
El-Gamal eloquently expressed that view using almost holy terms: “The revolution is
like a religion and the revolutionary is like a prophet; his role is to give direction and
his message is to convince people with change... the revolution succeeds when the
largest number of people subscribe to the agenda of change and not when you change
the government because your role as a revolutionary is to spread the ideals and not
assume power yourself”. On the topic of organization El-Gamal was clear that an
organization is a means and not an end. The change comes from the people. They
need “someone to hold the torch” but the organization is never a replacement for the
people. “And that’s the difference between ‘us’ and the Muslim brotherhood”, ElGamal concluded.
Beyond leaderless-ness, ‘horizontalism’ and rhizomes are two other concepts
that attempt to capture the new informal mode of organization manifested in the
Egyptian Uprising. In his article, John Chalcraft uses ‘horizontalism’ to refer to an
array of features observed in the Egyptian Revolution - leaderless protests,
decentralized networks, deliberative rather than representative democracy, the
absence of top-down command, the emphasis on consensus and the rejection of
dogma and political ideology.77
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Rhizomes is a concept introduced by Deleuze and Guattari in different
contexts. With the eruption of the Egyptian Revolution many activists and
intellectuals found the concept suitable to explain horizontal modes of organization.
Understanding rhizomes as plants with roots, Aly El-Raggal explains that new youth
movements are linked together underground through strong roots that intertwine and
spread horizontally.”78 There is no way to break down a rhizomatic structure because
once you cut one part; it grows up in a different part. It simply has no beginning, no
middle and no end. “It is always a middle, always in process”.79 This Key feature of a
rhizome of not having a single reference point is exactly what enabled it to defeat the
Mubarak regime, which only knew how to fight against tree structures with clear
chain of command.
This organizational model relying on spontaneous mobilization and horizontal
networks of communication proved so effective in challenging entrenched
authoritarian rule and seemingly making success in the matter of couple of weeks by
toppling Mubarak. This success narrative was a popularly held one in 2011 especially
as the Tahrir model proved so inspiring that it spread across the world to Spain,
Greece and as far as the US manifested in the global Occupy Movement.80 However,
with the unfolding events of the transitional phase in Egypt over the past three years,
more scholars are reassessing the limits and roles of horizontal movements.81 What
appeared at first a new way of conducting politics is increasingly proving difficult to
assert itself. There is an increasing realization that tools successful for bringing down
a system are not necessarily suited for setting up a new one.
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Developing from a protest movement to a political one with an organizational
structure that allows flexibility and sustainability is the challenge that faced all youth
movements whether they existed before the revolution or not. Maha Abdelrahman
points out that this dilemma is not unique to Egypt: it was highlighted in different
contexts where the survival of revolutionary process requires the formation of
institutions that provides alternative to the existing or collapsed regime, while at the
same time the control of those institutions end up “freezing its dialectic in a
totalitarian bureaucratic monolith”82
The revolution is not finished but it transforms from one form to the other. It
has to move to the institutions; if not, then to the political opposition. If it achieves
neither then it fails. The establishment of political parties and the transition from the
revolution to politics was necessary but it had to be done based on revolutionary
ideals.
When the youth realized they needed to become part of the formal political
structure in order to be effective some of them started creating or joining newly
created parties but with much confusion and lack of vision. Political parties are by
definition excluded from social movements, as they do not fall within the category of
contentious politics since they represent official form of political engagement within
the formal boundaries. However, in the post-revolution Egyptian context political
parties act very much as social movements. In terms of tactics, they use protest,
campaigns and exhibit features of SMOs. All the major parties were created after the
election of the first parliament in 2012 and never entered any sort of elections since
their inauguration. Moreover, given the dynamic revolutionary circumstances, it is
very common to find many members of political parties who are also members of
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other revolutionary groups with often overlapping roles. It is also common to find
youth acting in different capacities and keeping distance and closeness according to
the events on the ground. In post-revolution Egypt, political parties are seen by many
youth not as means to compete over power, as is the classic goal of political parties.
Rather, they regard them as yet another tool in the ongoing struggle by which they
can help push for the goals of the revolution.83
2.5 Moral Resources
Legitimacy
Legitimacy is an indispensible resource for any movement. The more
legitimate the public perceives the movement’s members and demands, the more the
movement has success chances for realizing its goals. Legitimacy, as many scholars
note can be derived from a number of sources and take different forms. 84
Revolutionary youth sought to secure legitimacy through aggregating it from
celebrities and public figures. Acknowledging that young age is often a delegitimizing
factor in a culture that accords age a great respect, the youth depended on figures
already enjoying people’s credibility to win legitimacy. Many instances could be cited
to demonstrate that. For example, the two parties predominately formed of youth
Masr Al-Qawiya and Al-Dostour rely on two well-known political figures as heads of
the parties. This helped increasing the legitimacy they enjoyed, however, as both
figures became increasingly condemned, it can noticed how a source of legitimation
becomes a liability transforming into a deligitimation factor instead. The youth also
tried to secure legitimacy through self-production. By presenting few young
candidates in the first parliamentary elections and frequently presenting young
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spokespersons in the media, youth movements endeavored to gain legitimacy to its
members and consequently demands.
2.6 Material Resources
Money
Money is the most fungible resource, meaning that it could be transformed
into other types of resources as the need arises.85 Movements with large amounts of
fungible resources have more flexibility in choosing their strategies and tactics as
opposed to those movements whose resources are context-dependent. This could be
seen in the case of youth’s lack of financial means in Egypt. Having little money
meant that the youth’s political options were limited. To engage in the formal political
process through the creation of a party a lot of money is needed. Ahmed Abdel
Gawad, considered the lack of sustainable funding for Masr Al-Qawiya one of the
biggest challenges the party is facing. In my interview with him, he noted that the
dependence on businessmen is not reliable and often involves direction of policies
which the party could not accept.86 This was the case with Al-Adl party for example
and that is why it could not continue, he concluded. Abdel Gawad’s concern is
consistent with the literature drawing attention to the risks attached to monetary
patronage. He continued: “that is why we rely on members but it is still difficult.
When the party was first launched we had 75 offices, now we only have 20-30.”87 The
fungibility of money, however, has its limitations. Often it cannot secure moral
resources, specifically legitimacy.
2.7 Cultural Resources
Finally, cultural resources being so pervasive and taken for granted,
sometimes could not be realized as resources. As explained above, cultural resources
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are all the array of symbols, values and beliefs available to use in a specific culture to
facilitate the actions of daily life. The cultural element was clear since the “Friday of
Rage” where mosques were used as meeting points for demonstrations. Moreover, the
use of old patriotic Egyptian songs, for example, appealed to a wide variety of people
and was another way to capitalize on the shared cultural resources. The youth
attempted to make use of the cultural resources in form but in terms of content, many
of their beliefs and ideals contradicted the culture in which they operated making their
task more challenging. This is discussed in detail in chapter four. In brief, from all
resources, cultural resources provide a great asset for utilization that does not require
except the attentiveness to the culture and the skill of rhetoric adaptation to speak to
the people in their own language.
2.8 Conclusion
As Hannah Arendt puts it, “[r]evolutions, as a rule, are not made but
happen”.88 They are not the result of revolutionary plots but they are the outcome of
disintegration of power at a certain moment. This could not be more true for the
Egyptian Revolution. It took everyone, including those who “organized” it by
surprise. As soon as people took to the streets in massive numbers on January 25th, the
uprising took a life of its own with every participant becoming a leader of himself. No
public figure could present himself as representing the masses and no single
organization could claim responsibility for the uprising. But, the “leaderless-ness” of
the Egyptian Revolution as much as it was a major factor for its success constituted a
great obstacle for the development of the revolutionary movement post Mubarak’s
fall. The lack of political ideology, pre-existing structured organization and central
leadership, all important resources to sustain a social movement led some to believe
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the revolution was one without revolutionaries or as others put it “a revolution on the
form of revolution itself”89. This proved to have great consequences on the course of
the unfolding of events and the prospects of youth’s secure of other important
resources which are greatly dependent on the form of organization and kind of
leadership.
It would be mistaken to talk about the ‘youth’ as one coherent group. Different
youth groups took diverse tracks since the downfall of Mubarak; however they share
certain characteristics by virtue of sharing the same age range and consequently earlylife experiences. Revolutionary organization has taken several shapes since the
beginning of the uprising reflecting the youthful nature of the participants, their
organizational (in)experience and their ideological trends. The absence of clear
vision, political experience and unified leadership led the youth to “move to the
streets and remain stuck in the streets”90 in the role of protestors. The question of
organization remains to be asked by many: have networks have proven their failure as
modes of organization and if so whether the solution is to resort to traditional modes
of vertical organization if indeed any change is to occur? When can the shift be made
to formal forms of organization and when can it prove effective?
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Chapter 3: Political Context
“An opportunity not perceived is not an opportunity at all”
William Gamason and David Meyer
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I used Resource Mobilization Theory to understand
the relative success and failure of the youth in organizing and consequently
mobilizing. RMT is important in explaining how resources rather than grievances can
provide impetus for action. However, focusing primarily on the movement “itself”,
the theory risks ignoring the context in which the movement is operating and
consequently its ability to access and utilize available resources. Resources can be
used to answer the question of why movements emerge or succeed in a particular area
and not another but it cannot explain why movements fail despite having access to the
same resources. Holding context constant and dealing with resources as the only
explanatory factor would lead to a partial understanding, at best. Therefore, an
additional approach that goes beyond the confinement of social movement is
necessary.
In this chapter I turn to the world surrounding youth movements to examine its
impact on their activities. Using Political Opportunity structure (POS) to complement
RMT, this chapter examines the effect of political context on the development and
outcome of youth revolutionary movements since the downfall of Mubarak.
Acknowledging that social movements do not choose their tools, goals and tactics in a
vacuum, I demonstrate in this chapter how the closure of the political regime and its
capacity and propensity for repression has affected the kinds of claims and tools the
youth engaged in response. Finally, the concept of “missed opportunities” will also be
applied to identify situations conducive to mobilization that were not used effectively.
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3.2 Political Process Approach
Political Process Approach is based on the premise that political context is
essential in shaping social movements’ development, responses and effectiveness.
Interested in emphasizing the link between activists and institutional politics, state
action acquires primary importance in analysis as not only does it affect the size of
mobilization but also its location and the form it takes. 91 Political Process model
posits that the activities and creativity of social movements can only be analyzed and
understood by examining the political context and “the rules of the game in which
those choices were made”.92 In other words, agency cannot be understood in isolation
of structure.
At the core of the Political Process Approach is Political Opportunity
Structure. Broadly defined, opportunities can be considered “options for collective
action, with chances and risks attached to them which depend on factors outside the
mobilizing group.” 93 There is no agreement among scholars on the factors of the
political context that constitutes political opportunity. The variables studied are so
diverse that they include: state capacity for repression, public policy changes, the
organizations of previous challengers, the activities of countermovement opponents,
the perception of political opportunity by activists, the openness and ideological
positions of political parties and the constraints on state policy by international
alliances, to name a few.94 This broad conceptualization of opportunities reminds us
of the conceptualization of resources except that it extends to include almost
everything outside the social movement. Because of the inclusiveness of the concept,

91

David S. Meyer (2004) Protest and Political Opportunities, Annual Review of Sociology, 30, 131.
Ibid, 128.
93
Quoted in Marco Giugni (2009) Political Opportunities: From Tilly to Tilly. Swiss Political Science
Review, 15 (2), 361–68. 361.
94
Meyer, Protest and Political Opportunities, 135.
92

56

different scholars have emphasized different aspects of opportunity depending on the
movements they study and the questions they ask.
In this chapter, I build on McAdam’s synthesis of four factors that constitute
political opportunity; two relating to the state: access to political system and
diminishing state repression and two relating to the elites: division within the elite and
the presence of elite allies.
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Moreover, I utilize the concept of perceived

opportunities, believing that opportunities need to be recognized before they can be
seized. Similar to the idea that the mere presence of resources is not enough for
mobilization if actors have no access to them, the mere “presence” of opportunities is
useless if they are not perceived. [A]n opportunity not recognized is not an
opportunity at all.”96
The extent to which social actors are aware of changes in the political context
and the existence of an opportunity deserves more attention. “[E]ven if opportunities
are objective, external to the actor, what explains the action is the actor’s desire
together with ‘his beliefs about the opportunities’”
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. Here two contrasting

conceptions arise. The first one views activists as rational actors who monitor the
state and the society to know which claims to make and how. In that regard, they plan
for their actions strategically in accordance with the realities of their situation. The
second view, doubts the intentionality of activists regarding them as always “trying to
mobilize and are usually unsuccessful”.98 In this view, opportunities are considered as
simply environmental conditions allowing protest rather than signals that should be
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picked up upon.99 In the Egyptian context, the second conception seems to apply more
adequately. This was confirmed to me throughout my interviews by a commonly
repeated sentence -- “we had no strategy.”100 However, it is important to note that it is
possible inside every SMO to have the two types of actors – those passionate activists
who constantly endeavor to mobilize regardless of limitations and the more
experienced ones who seek to adjust rhetoric, tactics and focus to suit the changing
political circumstances.
After having defined what aspects of the political context affect youth
movements in Egypt the most, it is equally important to define how they affect those
movements. As scholars of POS disagree on the variables, they also differ on their
relationship to outcomes. Scholars typically examined the effect of exogenous factors
on the movement in five main areas: the ability to mobilize, the types of tactics and
strategies used, the impact on institutional politics, the kind of claims it can advance,
and finally the alliances it can cultivate.101 Obviously, different elements of political
opportunity would work differently for these distinct dependent variables. Following
McAdam’s advice on the importance of being “explicit about which dependent
variable we are seeking to explain and which dimensions of political opportunity are
germane to that explanation”102, I restrict my inquiry to the first two factors.
The concept of open and closed structures is essential to POS. Open systems
often have a limited capacity to act, while closed systems have larger capacity for
action. 103 The degree of (objective or perceived) openness or closure of a regime
determines the response of social movements and whether their strategies become
assimilative or confrontational. Complementary to openness and closure (input
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structures) is the distinction between strong and weak states (output capacity). The
strength of a state in this model is measured by the state’s ability to act independently
and effectively implement the policies. Following this model developed by Herbert P
Kitschelt, strong and closed systems such as the one in Egypt encourages social
movements to use confrontational strategies.
Finally, one major limitation of the political process approach or the
opportunity structure model is that it was mainly developed and applied in western
democracies. The conceptualization of the model is based on the study of four
western countries: the USA, France, Germany and Sweden.104 Little efforts have been
directed in testing the model and how it functions in authoritarian or nondemocratic
contexts. This chapter will contribute to the existing literature by observing how the
major concepts of the approach can be applied and understood in the Egyptian context
over three different post-revolution regimes.
3.3 Institutional Structures
In the last section I presented a general overview of the Political Process
Approach in order to give an idea about the main tenants of the model that will be
used in this chapter. In this section, I start to define more specifically the first set of
elements that constitute the institutional structures and apply them in the Egyptian
Context. These elements are a modified version of Doug McAdam’s synthesis of
political opportunity structures. As aforementioned, McAdam observed that scholars’
conceptions of relevant dimensions of the political structure greatly overlapped.
Therefore, he attempted to combine the most important structural opportunities in a
consensual fourfold typology that consists of: “1) the relative openness or closure of
the institutionalized political system 2) the stability or instability of that broad set of
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elite alignments that typically undergird a polity 3) the presence or absence of elite
allies 4) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression.”105
In the case of Egypt, I argue that from the institutional structures, state
repression has had the greatest effect on the prospects of youth mobilization and on
the types of strategies and tactics they employed. In my analysis, I only focus on the
two elements relating to the state as constitute the “structural” components of the
political opportunity. Elites on the other hand, can be more adequately conceived as
part of the configuration of powers, which is more dynamic and not strictly structural.
Moreover, the possibility of cultivating elite alliances and benefiting from elite
divisions was already discussed under moral resources in chapter two and will also be
tackled from a different angle in the next chapter on framing. Although it could be
argued that the state’s capacity and propensity for repression is closely related to the
degree of openness or closure of a regime, I agree with McAdam in dealing with them
as two separate variables as they affect different aspects of the youth movement. The
combination of these two institutional opportunities along with the cultural
opportunities discussed next chapter help explain the youth’s resort to protest and
their failure to access or impact institutional politics and realize the goals of the
revolution.
3.3.1 State propensity and capacity for repression
The relationship between repression and protest has been the subject of many
debates between scholars. Conceptualizing state’s repression, two kinds of repression
need to be distinguished: institutional and situational. The effect of the two kinds of
repression is different for mobilization. Situational repression refers to the sporadic
coercive response to events or populations. This includes police intervention using
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repression in an ad-hoc manner. Institutional repression on the other hand, is
systematic and constant targeting of groups, organizations or populations denying
them access to formal institutions in visible ways. In the case of Egypt, the following
cases of state repression represent institutional repression where the state consciously
and constantly targeted youth groups with the aim of silencing their calls for change
and reinforce the structures of authoritarianism.
One of the main reasons for the eruption of the Egyptian Revolution was the
increased state repression manifested most evidently in police brutality. This was
reflected in the youth’s symbolic choice of January 25 Police Day for demonstrations.
In facing state’s brutality, the revolutionaries chose peacefulness as a conscious and
strategic weapon. This did not mean that limited violence was not used in selfdefense. The Egyptian state’s capacity to repress was dealt a great blow on January 28
by the popular burning down of police stations. However, with the military’s
intervention on the same day, repression was restored at the hands of the military
police and army forces who engaged in repeated clashes with the youth throughout
2011 and 2012.
The first display of state repression came as early as March 9, 2011 when the
military police violently destroyed tent camps remaining from the sit-in in Tahrir
Square and forcibly took the demonstrators inside the Egyptian Museum where they
were subjected to brutal beating and torture. Later around 200 youth of those arrested
were sent to nine military prisons where they faced military trials106 – a practice that
has become a hallmark of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)’s rule
over the following 18 months. In just six months after the military taking to the streets
on January 28, 2011 more than 12,000 civilians were brought before military courts
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for a wide range of crimes107. This number exceeded the total number of all military
trials conducted over the 30-year Hosni Mubarak rule. Although not all the cases were
of political nature, the regime used military courts as a weapon to terrorize the youth
and limit their mobilization efforts. For example, Asmaa Mahfouz, a co-founder of 6
April youth Movement and an iconic figure of the Egyptian Revolution was arrested
and referred to a military trial in August 2011 over a tweet for inciting violence.
Charges were later dropped and Mahfouz was of jail; however the regime’s message
was clear. No criticism of SCAF would be allowed.
On the same day, March 9, 2011 female protestors were subjected to ‘virginity
tests’ by the military police and threatened with prostitution charges. This was the
first in a series of actions undertaken by the regime by way of humiliation and
breaking the moral of the revolutionaries. Violence against female protestors and
protestors in general only increased in intensity, visibility and frequency over the
following months with revolutionaries being killed, injured and arrested every month.
In the period between February 2011 and June 2012 when SCAF was in control more
than 350 people were killed in social and political protests and while in detention108.
Moreover, more than 12,000 were injured according to the figures of the ministry of
health. Other sources raise the figure up to 16,000.109
Tahrir became the site of constant struggle for control between the protestors
and the military. Whenever protestors attempted to occupy the square, violent
repression was the regime’s only response. In April 2011 the military dispersed by
force a sit-in in Tahrir that consisted of tens of thousands including a dozen officers
who joined the revolution demanding a radical change of the Mubarak regime. The
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same violent dispersal of protestors was repeated by the military in August, on the
first day of Ramadan to clear up the sit-in that has taken place for a month. However,
state’s brutality was not confined to Tahrir. Many violent episodes took place in 2011
around the Israeli Embassy in May, outside Balloon’s Theatre in June and in Maspero
neighborhood in front of the Public TV building in October. 110 In all of these clashes,
the state’s security forces used disproportionate power resulting in the killing and the
arrest of hundreds of protestors, mostly young people. What started as undercover
state repression that the population did not want to believe, took more visible and
brutal forms culminating in the tragic beating and stripping of a female protestor in
the vicinity of Tahrir Square in December 2011. The clashes of Mohamed Mahmoud
and the sit-in Cabinet constituted a turning point in the state’s use of repression as for
the first times state’s brutality in dealing with protestors was blatantly visually
documented. The picture of the dragged female protestor made it to the newspapers
front pages and had great effects on the youth who regarded it as the epitome of the
state’s disregard to any human rights values.
During President Mohamed Morsi’s rule, both the state’s capacity and
propensity for repression were significantly reduced. The non-cooperation of state
institutions including the police with Morsi reduced the regime’s capacity to use
violence to repress the youth opposition. Instead the repression had more of a
situational nature rather than an institutional one. The clashes turned to be between
civilians – Muslim brotherhood opponents and proponents with the security forces
often taking a neutral stance. Examples include Al-Itihadeyya clashes and AlMokattam incident. The major exception to that was the Port Said incident when the
police fired against the protestors following death penalty sentencing in the case of
110

For a timeline of the revolution’s events see Ghazala Irshad (2012, June) Timeline: Egypt’s
Transition. Cairo Review. 215-219. For an online version:
http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/CairoReview/Lists/Articles/Attachments/225/Egypt-Timeline.pdf

63

Port Said massacre. Following clashes in Port Said and other cities resulted in the
killing of tens of people and the declaration of a partial emergency state. In terms of
targeting youth activists, several youth figures such as Alaa Abdel Fattah, Ahmed
Douma and others were summoned on charges of inciting against the Muslim
Brotherhood. Although these cases were dropped after the ouster of Morsi, the
crackdown on activists increased the animosity between the revolutionary youth and
the Muslim Brotherhood. The repression during Morsi’s rule was in most cases
situational, however the institutional element cannot be ignored. The youth who
organized in opposition of Morsi, despite having voted for him in the second round
like April 6 Movement and activists like Alaa Abdel Fattah, were a clear target for the
Muslim Brotherhood regime. The systematic crackdown on opposition was less
effective than the SCAF’s for reasons that have to do with capacity rather than
political will.
With the ouster of Mohammed Morsi on July 3, 2013 state repression was
reinstituted in the most brutal way taking a whole new level. The Rabaa massacre
ushered the state’s new policy of dealing with the opposition. As the new regime
sought to entrench itself, political repression expanded beyond the Muslim
Brotherhood and Islamists to the revolutionary youth. A new law incriminating
protest was issued specifically to target activists. Major youth figures were put in jail
along with more than 40 thousands political detainees.111 But repression is not only
confined to the physical sense. What is most remarkable about the use of repression
under Sisi is that it created a setting in which civil society practices “self-repression”.
The clearest case is the private owned media which allied itself with the regime and
actively engaged in repressing opponents to the military rule. Through defaming
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campaigns and spreading conspiracy theories about the January 25 Revolution and its
youth activists, the media was able to propagate fear and hatred and increase
polarization in the society while not “physically” engaging in repression.
Effects of Repression
As much as repression had direct effect on the youth in terms of casualties, it
also provided an opportunity to discredit the regime. Being part of a peaceful
revolution, the youth made use of repression to gain the sympathy of the people and
embarrass the regime. An activist told me “the intelligence is to drag your opponent
(the state) to use excessive force while you maintain your peacefulness in order to
gain the public’s support and sympathy”112 when asked about whether the youth were
successful in doing so, he answered that it happened naturally, but if it was planned
the results would have been much better. The caveat for this scenario to happen is
strong media coverage and documentation. This could be seen most clearly in
Mohamed Mahmoud and the cabinet clashes. Although these were not the first time
for full-fledged clashes to take place between protestors and the military police as I
have shown in the previous section, they were the first to receive extensive media
coverage. Here the element of framing, which will be discussed at length in the next
chapter, overlaps in the analysis. However, what I am interested in here is the youth’s
use of state repression as a political opportunity to raise their demands. In Mohamed
Mahmoud, what started as an act of solidarity with the families of the martyrs of the
revolution’s sit in, turned into a second revolutionary wave due to the police’s use of
lethal force. The regime’s targeting of eyes specifically in those clashes arose the
sympathy of the people with revolutionaries. As the events gained more momentum,
the SCAF was forced to speed up the schedule for power transfer and accept the
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resignation of Essam Sharaf, the first prime minister after the revolution. While this
was a partially victory for the demonstrators, the choice of Kamal Al-Ganzouri
confirmed that the SCAF was not sincere in responding to the youth’s demands who
called for a civil presidential council. The youth tried to utilize the political
opportunity the events created and the regime fostered, however, for reasons having
to do with configuration of actors and framing, they were not successful in making the
best out of it.
The second effect of repression is linked to the strategies and tactics the youth
employed during the transitional period. With clashes occurring on a monthly basis,
the revolutionary youth were always put in a defense, reactionary position instead of a
position of action. Hatem Tallima, a member of the Revolutionary Socialists’ political
bureau, admits that a big mistake the revolutionaries fell into during the SCAF’s and
Morsi’s rule was that they remained in the activists role taking up any and every
possible confrontation with the state.113 “There were a lot of battles that we were
dragged into that pushed us away from (formal) politics and forced us to remain in the
streets”, Tallima reiterated. Tallima also believe that one of the Revolutionary
Socialists’ mistakes was not to join the Revolution Youth Coalition to help establish a
political front for the revolution. State’s repression made it easier for the youth to
practice what they knew best – protest. Instead of working on political alternatives,
the youth found in repression the occasion to assume the role of victimization or the
never-ending revolutionary. Being engaged in constant clashes and choosing the
wrong battles prevented the revolutionary youth of developing long-term strategies. It
is remarkable observing youth’s activity over the different regimes to note that their
response to the state’s use of repression was through the use of the same tactics. In the
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words of one youth activist “the youth were all the time playing but without scoring
any goals.”114
Consistent with the literature suggesting that repression could serve as a
precursor for mobilization, repression gave opportunities for the youth to organize.
This organization, however, was mostly in the form of campaigns that tackled specific
issues. The extensive use of military trials gave rise to the creation of one of the most
active youth groups – No to Military Trials. By having an outspoken co-founder
Mona Seif, the movement was able to use military trials as an opportunity to question
military rule. Similarly, Mohamed Mahmoud and the cabinet clashes provided an
opportunity for the emergence of “Kazeboon” (Liars) movement to combat the
perceived lies of the SCAF and showcase their crimes in videos in different
neighborhoods in Egypt. Although these campaigns were able to achieve relative
success compared to their declared goals and scope of action, no sustainable
organizations were created to plan more strategically for realizing the larger goals of
the revolution. The campaigns were able to make media appearance and force the
issues of military trials, eyes targeting and other forms of military repression in the
public discourse, but the revolutionaries did not succeed in building upon this
momentum to develop an all-inclusive political discourse beyond the momentary
reactions.
3.3.2 Access to Political System
After discussing the effect of repression, the second element in the political
environment that affects youth movements is the degree of openness or closure of the
political regime. The two factors that define the extent of openness or closure of a
regime are centralization and separation of power. Starting with the first factor, the
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greater the centralization of a system, the more difficult it is for outside actors to gain
formal access and the harder it is for the regime to act. Decentralized states provide
multiple access points and decision-making by virtue of having multiple state actors.
Secondly, the degree of separation of power between the three branches of the
government (Judiciary, legislative and executive) and inside each branch determines
the degree of formal access. The greater the separation of powers the greater the
degree of formal access and the more limited the capacity of the state is to act.115
Applying this to Egypt, Egypt is clearly a case of a highly centralized regime.
It is an executive form of centralization that revolves around the figure of the
president. The executive is autonomous from the state, and the state is autonomous
from society.116 Therefore, when Mubarak was removed he could easily be replaced
by the SCAF as a head of state. This executive centralization where the president
solely makes the decisions, favors the authoritarian regime’s ability to adapt to
challenges. It also allows it to keep tight control on who can penetrate the system.
Local councils provide one opportunity to effect the system and push for more
decentralization. It is worth mentioning that all attempts at reforming local councils
law after the revolution were faced by great obstacles from the regime. The law
governing local administration dating back to 1979 gives the president the right to
directly appoint governors and restrict the local councils’ role to a monitoring rather
than an executive one. According to Tariq Ismail, an activist working on local
empowerment, one of the biggest missed opportunities for the youth was using the
revolution’s fervor to push for the dissolving of the pre-revolution local councils.
According to Tariq, if the youth had put municipalities as a priority and local
elections were held in 2011, the youth could have had an access point to the regime
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by which they could have changed from below. Mina George, a former member of
Strong Egypt Party shares the same view. “We had a golden opportunity in 2011 to
occupy the state’s institutions through the municipalities… imagine if we had 54,000
youth members working directly with the people all over Egypt”117. The Revolution
Youth Coalition and other pro-change movements did call for disbanding local
councils in the wake of the revolution. In June 2011 the administrative court ordered
the dissolving of all local councils118. The ruling was never put into execution and no
local elections were ever held since that date.
With regard to the legislature, the electoral system provides a larger or lesser
degree of system access depending on its degree of proportionality. Majoritarian or
plurality systems provide less access for emerging political actors than proportional
systems. In Egypt, after the revolution, the SCAF amended the electoral law to
introduce a parallel voting system. In the first parliamentary elections after the
revolution in 2011, two thirds of the seats were elected by party proportional
representation while the remaining third were elected by a form of bloc voting.
Although this could be regarded as a larger degree of openness from the previous
system under Mubarak in which bloc voting was exclusively used, the system still
contained many constraints for youth’s effective engagement with the elections. In
addition to the one third of the seats elected by bloc voting in two-seats
constituencies, more importantly, the 50 percent quota for laborers and farmers was
retained. This significantly reduced the chances of youth (mostly urban) from the
same electoral district to run for the parliament. There are of course many reasons for
the modest results of the youth in the elections, some of which were already outlined
in chapter two under material resources. This section is only interested in
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demonstrating the structural elements of the political context pertaining to the youth’s
ability to access the political system. Returning to the parliamentary constraints, just
one day before his departure, President Adly Mansour issued a new controversial
electoral law which stipulates that nearly 80 percent of the future parliament’s seats
will be elected by individual candidacy system. Moreover, either political parties or
individual candidates can fill the remaining seats.119 This law is clearly an attempt to
restore Mubarak’s pre-revolution parliament setting. With less proportionality, the
electoral system does not provide an opportunity for the youth to run for parliament. It
is a confirmation of the closure of the political system.
In terms of separation of powers, the second defining element in the degree of
openness of a regime, there is a great overlap between the different branches of
government in Egypt. During the SCAF’s rule, until the election of a parliament the
SCAF retained executive and legislative powers, which gave it autonomy in setting
the rules of the game. Although the nascent parliament after its election was not under
SCAF’s total control, the judiciary remained to be politicized. Under President
Mohamed Morsi’s rule the overlap between authorities continued to persist though
with many internal difficulties. With the ouster of Morsi and the dissolving of the
parliament the executive and legislative powers were once again grouped in the hands
of one person first President Adly Mansour then President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. The
politicization of the judiciary as best demonstrated by the mass death sentences issued
in April and June 2014 is a clear example of the effect of the executive on the
judiciary. In systems where there is no clear demarcation line between the different
branches of government, the target of mobilization cannot be clearly defined as no
demands can be made of specific branches of the government. In other words, the
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youth could not appeal to courts or exert pressure on the (inexistent) parliament to
effect policy change by the executive.
The case of Egypt is in accordance with the body of literature arguing that
constricted institutional opportunities offer possibilities for extrainstitutional
mobilization to happen.120 Although a closed system such as that of Egypt prevents
the youth from accessing formal institutions and thus being part of the regime, it
allowed them to organize in other forms outside of the system to effect change by
different means. This could be seen in the multitude of youth coalitions and
organizations that formed as pressure and protest groups. Some youth argue that
because of these institutional constraints, youth never had a real chance of engaging
formally with the regime. Instead, they hold that they should have prolonged the first
transitional period and utilized this time to “dismantle the structures of repression”.121
According to youth activist Mohamed Shams, the regime with this centralized
structure does not allow for any kind of penetration. “Egypt is not a country of
political parties,” he was definite to conclude. Although he admitted that informal
politics have to be institutionalized at some point, the idea is in the timing for him and
engaging in negotiations from a position of strength to secure a gradual access to the
system. Having no access to the system whether in terms of effect or actually being
part of it discouraged the development of alternative political programs by the youth.
Seeing that there are no political openings in the system reinforced the primacy of
informal politics as means to advocate for change.
To sum up this section, state’s repression and closed structure prevented the
youth from accessing the political system and engaging formally with political
institutions. However, these constricted and constraining settings presented different
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kinds of opportunities for extrainstitutional mobilization. When properly utilized,
these opportunities were able to achieve relative degrees of success such as the case
of Mohamed Mahmoud clashes which forced the SCAF to announce a date for the
presidential elections and a schedule for the transition of power to a civilian entity.
However, the youth missed several opportunities to capitalize on the state’s use of
repression to their benefit. They also were not able to change the rules of the game to
guarantee formal access to the system. Instead of actively seeking to engage with
people’s issues on a local level through the municipalities, the youth were stuck in
street politics using protest the only tool they knew how to use. Eventually, this led to
demonstrations losing people’s sympathy and their effectiveness on the regime. Since
the downfall of Mubarak, Egypt witnessed three regimes, nevertheless, the Egyptian
revolution, let alone the youth, never ruled in any of them.
3.4. Conclusion
This chapter attempted to show the effect of the political context on the
youth’s choices of strategies and tactics and their impact on their environment by on
the institutional level. While the closed and strong nature of the political system in
Egypt combined with the state’s capacity and willingness to use repression had a
constraining effect on the possibilities of youth’s success and increased the difficulties
for youth mobilization in the formal arena, it opened way for extrainstitutional
mobilization. The youth’s overuse of protest exhausted their ability to perceive
political opportunities to engage with the regime on their own terms.
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Chapter 4: Framing and Counter-framing

4.1 Introduction
After discussing the resources and political context in which the youth
operated after the downfall of Mubarak, I turn to the discussion of the cultural
environment which shaped their collective action. One of the most used culturist
approaches is the framing perspective. Focusing on agency and interpretation, this
chapter will show how the youth framed themselves and their demands to the public.
Divided into three parts, the first section of the chapter deals with the ways the youth
framed the issues in Egypt and the demands of the revolution, the solutions they
proposed and the kind of rhetoric they used to motivate their adherents and mobilize
the people. I then turn to examine the extent to which the way they presented their
cause resonated with the people and how credible they were perceived. Finally, in the
last section I analyze the different framing processes that took place simultaneously. I
give special attention to how the regime and the media used counter-framing to
undermine the legitimacy of the youth’s actions. By understanding the power of ideas,
symbols and rhetoric, this chapter will cover the third dimension of this study
allowing a fuller understanding of the reasons behind the marginalized role of the
youth in the political scene.
4.2. Framing Approach
Framing approach to social movements is focused on examining the
connections between culture producers, culture consumers and the cultural object
itself.122 As Rhys Williams explains: “the analytic core of the approach is the socially
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and culturally available array of symbols and meanings from which movements can
draw”.123 Scholars, as always, have different conceptualizations of the core ideas of
the framing perspective.124 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow are two pioneer
scholars who sought to articulate and synthesize the main tenets of the approach in
manageable categories. Their contribution to the cultural approach, and particularly
framing in social movements is essential to the study of the interaction of meaning
and action in social movements.
In this section, I primarily depend on their extensive research to present an
overview of the framing approach that covers three main aspects. The first one deals
with the core-framing tasks, the second looks at the issue of resonance and its crucial
importance for framing, and finally the third part explores the different framing
processes the activists use to create and develop their frames. By understanding the
combination of these three dimensions, we could have a better idea of how
movements develop their frames of action, why some frames work better than others,
and how the cultural environment can facilitate or constrain the adoption and
propagation of certain frames. After establishing the theoretical framework, I will
apply these elements to the case of revolutionary youth in Egypt.
Every movement has three core-framing tasks that are indispensible. The first
is diagnostic framing. This frame refers to the way social actors identify the problem
at hand and its source. It also includes the identification of who to blame and who to
hold accountable and responsible for the problem. However, agreeing on the nature of
the problem does not necessarily translate into an agreement on the causes for the
problem.125 This could sometimes leads to disagreements within the SMOs belonging
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to the same movement. In Egypt for example, injustice, a common frame in social
movements, was commonly used; however beyond the agreement against Mubarak
different youth movements had different views on who or what specifically is to
blame for injustice. These variations with regard to the attributional component of the
diagnostic framing are reflected in the second core framing task - prognostic framing.
After defining the problem and its main cause, prognostic framing is
concerned with articulation of a proposed solution or a plan to fix the problem. It
simply attempts to answer “the Leninesque question of what is to be done.” 126
Usually, there is a correspondence between the diagnostic and the prognostic
framings, meaning that the way a group identifies the issue implies the kind of
strategies it will employ to remedy that issue. Here is where SMOs differ one more
time. While, it is easier to agree on the diagnosis of the problem, the solutions offered
vary according to the ideological and organizational background of the participants. It
is expected that prognostic frames also deal with the efficacy of the solutions
proposed by their adversaries and refute them. This is known as counter-framing. It is
important to note that The way in which opposition frames the youth’s movement
greatly influences how the activists frame their activities, often putting them on the
defensive whole they try to respond. This can be clearly applied to the youth during
the past four years.
The third and final core-framing task is the motivational frame which provides
the rationale for mobilization through the “construction of appropriate vocabularies of
motive”.127 Developing the agency component of collective action frames is entailed
in attending to that task. By socially constructing vocabularies, activists equip the
adherents to the movement with persuasive accounts to engage in collective action.
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As actors assert motives, their vocabularies become part of the daily discourse and
consequently part of the movement’s culture.128 In Egypt, youth used three general
vocabularies of motive that will be discussed thoroughly in the analysis section –
martyrs’ rights, dignity, protection of the revolution.
For frames to be successful, they need to resonate with the people. Resonance
is the function of two factors: “credibility of the proffered frame and its relative
salience.” 129 The credibility of the frame in turn is composed of three elements:
empirical credibility, the credibility of the claimsmakers, and frame consistency.
Starting with the first element, empirical credibility is the apparent fit between the
framings and the events in the world. In other words, it is the extent to which the
claims can be verified using empirical evidence. However, some scholars hold that
“empirical” credibility is in fact relative as evidence always exists, but it is up to the
people to interpret it in the way that appeals to them. Based on that, movements may
find difficulties appealing to a larger audience as the empirical credibility of their
frames can be determined only by a small cadre of adherents. The second element is
the credibility of the claimsmakers. It is hypothesized that the more experienced and
authoritative the claim articulator is, the more resonance his ideas and claims have.
Factors such as knowledge, status, expertise, and often age as, the case of Egypt
demonstrates, are important in establishing this perceived credibility. In Egypt, the
revolutionary youth realized this early on and engaged in a process of
“credentializing” by which they tried to capitalize on the credentials of the public
figures who supported their demands for change. As discussed previously using RMT,
this is one of the moral resources they attempted to use in order to gain legitimacy.
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Finally, the third element affecting credibility is the consistency of the frame. What is
meant by that is the degree to which the elements of the frame are perceived to be
congruent. Inconsistency can refer to the contradictions among the ideas being
advocated and it can also signal the disparity in the ideas, beliefs and actions of
movements? When there are fewer contradictions, the frame will resonate more with
people and will be a stronger mobilization force. Those three elements constitute the
credibility factor of the frame which affects its resonance with the target of
mobilization.
The second factor which affects the resonance of the frame is its salience or
how important it is perceived. Salience has three dimensions: “centrality, experiential
commensurability and narrative fidelity”130 also known as cultural resonance. As the
name implies, centrality refers to how fundamental the claims and ideas of the social
actors are to the lives of their target audience. It follows naturally, that the more
essential the concepts and the beliefs of the movement are to the people, the higher
the chances the frame has in successfully mobilizing them. Second, experiential
commensurability has to do with the everyday personal experience of the people.
When framings are too abstract and distant from the lived daily experience of the
people, it is more difficult for frames to have resonance with the people and
consequently they have lesser chances of mobilizing them. Finally, many scholars
believe narrative fidelity, which is also known as cultural resonance, has the greatest
effect on the salience of a frame. This factor refers to the degree to which the ideas
and beliefs that the activists advocate are in line with traditional culture of the people.
Myths, domain assumptions, and inherent ideology (as opposed to derived ideology)
are all expressions of public cultural narrations that affect the saliency and, by
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consequence, the resonance of the movement’s ideas. 131 As Williams concludes:
“[m]ovement discourse, ideologies, and actions must be culturally resonant – coherent
within some shared cultural repertoire – if they hope to strike bystander publics as
legitimate, or neutralize oppositional positions by elites and countermovements”.132
Turning to the third part of this section, activists do not develop and elaborate
on frames only using the three aforementioned core-framing tasks, but also through
three interrelated processes known as framing processes: discursive, strategic and
contested. Discursive processes concern the discussions, written communications, and
talks that occur in the context of movements activities. Strategic processes are
“framing processes that are deliberative, utilitarian, and goal directed” 133 . Put
differently, these are the calculated efforts by the activists of a movement to link their
interests and frames to those of their target audience. The third set of interrelated
processes is contested processes. Frames are not created in isolation of other factors.
More importantly, activists are faced by challengers who are also engaged in the
politics of significations. Counterframing by the antagonists, bystanders and the
media has been the greatest challenge for the revolutionary youth. Counterframing
includes attempts "to rebut, undermine, or neutralize a person's or group's myths,
versions of reality, or interpretive framework". 134 The activists in turn resort to
oppositional frames to try and repel, curtail, contain, or reverse the negative and
damaging effect to their movement’s previous claims. These episodes are known as
frame contests. It is important to note that these contests often take place in complex
multi-organizational arenas. Here the role of media and elites cannot be overlooked as
they greatly affect the extent of resonance of framing/counterframing. Social
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movements are often at a disadvantage in these situations as generally they do not
control the media; they do not choose the stories that get covered, or how the media
will present their claims.
4.3 Core-frame Tasks
4.3.1 Diagnostic Frame
As mentioned before, the purpose of a diagnostic frame for a movement is to
identify the problem and its root causes. The January 25 Revolution made it clear that
the problem lied in Mubarak’s authoritarian regime. In the call for demonstrations on
January 28th the event created by We are All Khaled Said was titled “a day of rage
against corruption, injustice, unemployment and torture”. In the description the
organizers also added absence of freedom. Authoritarianism and the injustice
associated with it could be identified as diagnostic frames for the uprising.
Corruption, police brutality, social injustice, repression, illiteracy, ignorance,
curtailment of freedoms, poverty, humiliation of human dignity can be considered
byproducts of the main ailment of authoritarianism. The revolutionaries directly laid
the responsibility upon Mubarak who resided over the country’s rule for more than 30
years. The diagnosis was clear and simple.
Disagreements in articulating the problem started to arise after the ouster of
Mubarak and the taking over of the SCAF. The youth realized that the problem is
bigger than Mubarak and that structures of authoritarianism run deeper into the
system than they initially thought. A minority of the revolutionaries believed from the
on start that military dictatorship is the root cause of problems. Given their clear
ideological inclinations, Revolutionary Socialists were consistent in diagnosing the
problem. It has always been the regime’s monopoly of power and wealth. The socioeconomic aspect of repression manifested in the lack of social justice, and violations
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of workers’ rights are at the core of their analysis of the issue. Two days after the
ouster of Mubarak, the Revolutionary Socialists issued a statement entitled “The
People Still Want the Downfall of the Regime” in which they called for the
continuation of demonstrations and expressing little trust in the army who they
accused of attempting to violently clear Tahrir Square. Most of the youth, beyond
their superficial identification of the issues with the Egyptian state, did not possess
nor develop serious intellectual treatise that comprehensively identified the core issue.
With the passing of time and the development of events, the revolutionaries’
articulation of the problem became more nuanced. Concepts that were previously
confined to academic scholarship such as the deep state, the military security
complex, the Generals State and networks of corruption entered into the revolutionary
daily lexicon adding more depth to their understanding of the fundamental issues with
the system.
Several months into Mohamed Morsi’s presidency, religious authoritarianism
replaced military authoritarianism as the overarching diagnostic frame. For many of
the youth, however, it was less an issue of “religious” than it was an issue of
“authoritarianism”. One activist elaborated:
Our problem is not with the military or the Muslim Brotherhood, our real
problem is with the idea that you could have one group controlling the country
and excluding everyone else. At the time of SCAF it was the generals, during
Morsi’s time it was his trusted brothers. Any organization, interest group, or
social class that seeks to monopolize the system and exclude or repress the rest
will be opposed. That’s why I opposed Mubarak, SCAF, Morsi and now
Sisi.135
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There is no comparison between the authoritarianism of the SCAF and that of Morsi
in terms of extent and level. It would be more accurate to point to the elements of
exclusion and alliance with the old state in propagating the authoritarianism frame.
According to Mohamed Abbas, an ex-Muslim Brotherhood member and a youth
activist leader, the Muslim Brotherhood’s “stupidity” in dealing with state’s
institutions is what gave rise to the development of the youth’s frame. He affirmed:
They [The Muslim Brotherhood] made all the wrong choices… they went
back on the promises they made in Fairmont agreement … they made an
alliance with the old regime against the revolutionaries hoping to fix the
regime from the inside… they are the ones in power, how else would they
expect the youth to characterize their actions?136
Regardless of whether the youth perceived Morsi as a dictator who sought to
empower his own group or a weak and naïve leader who could not be up to the
revolutionaries’ expectations, he remained to be blamed by the youth. The demands
of the revolution remained the same.
4.3.2 Prognostic Frame
The main criticism directed to the youth or those who advocate change in
general is that they do not have an alternative to present. For the youth, the prognosis
was straightforward: freedom is the solution to tyranny; democracy is the solution to
authoritarianism; social justice is the solution to poverty; the respect of human dignity
is the solution to torture and state-inflicted humiliation. Beyond these generic values,
the youth never developed a political program to demonstrate what these ideals
actually mean in real life and how they could be applied. One major reason for that is
that the youth do not form a united class, despite sharing many commonalities. With
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many youth organizations refusing the constraints of political ideology or even the
formal engagement in politics, their solutions remained to be in the realm of
pressuring the regime for more changes.
Youth activists realize that shortcoming, but only a few of them have engaged
in thoughtful attempts to rise above the daily battles and develop a long-term vision
and strategy. One of these youth attempts is by Iyad El-Baghdadi, an online Arab
activist. Writing a few days before the downfall of Mubarak, El-Baghdadi asked a
question everyone was too preoccupied in the events to contemplate: “A constitution
must be preceded by a statement or a manifesto. Do we have one?”137 Recognizing
that the Arab Spring was not ideologically tinted, El-Baghdadi repeatedly stipulated
that if the youth wanted to replace the tyrants they needed to develop a manifesto. As
early as December 2011 he predicted and rightly so, that if the youth do not present an
alternative, the old guard will be back to fill in the gap. El-Baghdadi decided to take
on the task of articulating his version of “Islamic libertarianism” in a book by the title
The Arab Spring Manifesto. His attempt is one of the very few, if not the first by
youth activists and intellectuals, to develop an alternative vision. More efforts
representing the diverse backgrounds of the youth are needed in that direction.
In terms of strategies and tactics employed to respond to the problems
identified in the diagnostic frame, protest arose as the corrective measure used by the
youth to push for the revolution’s goals. While the regime practiced politics, issuing
laws, arresting protestors, putting civilians on military trials, and forming cabinets, the
youth’s proposed solution was the same: demonstrations. This form of “street
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politics”, 138 although more effective earlier in 2011 than later on, reflected the
prognostic deficiency of the youth. In terms of momentary actions, there were many
“solutions” presented by the revolutionaries at different stages to solve the issue of
military being in power. For example, prior to Mubarak’s ouster, the revolutionary
socialists advocated the development of popular committees to popular councils that
elect higher councils to eventually represent the revolution. The Revolution Youth
Coalition called for the creation of a presidential council that involves one military
figure in addition to two civilians. This proposed solution was developed to a full
civilian presidential council and became the demand of many revolutionaries during
2011. The naivety in believing that the military council would willingly hand over
power to an unelected civilian council, along with the many internal disagreements on
who represents the people and the inexistent mechanism to choose the figures, led the
term to become a joke among activists in the following years.
4.3.3 Motivational Frame
Vocabularies of motive provide the activists in a movement with reasons to
identify with the goals of the movement and engage in action. They are created
through the course of interaction among actors and are usually invoked when the
participant’s action is put into question.139 The youth in Egypt employed a variety of
rhetoric to appeal to the people at large and motivate the members of their groups. It
is noticeable that the language used generally appealed to emotions and not reason.
This proved effective most of the time in mobilizing the people and especially the
youth who are carried away easily by enthusiasm. Egyptians, an emotional people, as
they are often referred to, proved to respond more positively to calls that address their
feelings. Evident in the naming of the first Friday “The Friday of Rage”, emotions
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varying from anger to fear passing by pride continued to play a significant role in
mobilizing people by different parties. In determining the vocabularies of motive used
by youth, I applied a combination of methods. First, I examined the names given to
more than 65 Friday demonstrations during the SCAF’s and Morsi’s rule. Second, I
conducted an extensive survey of the Facebook pages of Revolution Youth Coalition,
We are All Khaled Said, 6th of April Movement and Revolutionary Socialists
particularly looking at their created events. I also consulted statements calling for
action on the pages of youth and youth dominated parties such as Masr Al-Qawiya,
Al-Tayyar Al-Masry and Al-Dostour. Finally, I depended on personal interviews with
youth activists who completed the picture with their lived experiences and
backgrounds. Next are the three kinds of vocabularies of action the youth utilized in
their framing to provide motivational impetus for collection action – Martyrs’ rights,
dignity, protection of the revolution.
Martyrs’ Rights
One very common motif used by the revolutionary youth to provide rational
for their actions is the defense of martyrs’ rights. During the 18 days of the revolution
until the ouster of Mubarak, 846 protestors were killed by the police and security
forces.140 While calls for bread, social justice, freedom and human dignity were the
demands during the 18 days, after Mubarak’s overthrow the retribution for martyrs
was added to the list of demands and also became a motivating factor in itself to call
for action. This is manifested in the famous slogan “Either we get their rights or we
die as they [the martyrs] did”141. On April 8, 2011 the million-man demonstration was
named “purification and judgment”. The most famous slogan that day was
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“Retribution, retribution. They shot our brothers with bullets”142. It is remarkable that
these slogans continued to live on and be used consistently for mobilization
throughout the time of SCAF, Morsi and Sisi. The dedication of events for the sole
purpose of demanding retribution to the martyrs also was a feature common to all
three periods. Martyr’s blood is not for sale, Martyrs’ rights Friday, Martyrs’
memorial Friday, Maspero’s Martyrs’ Friday, the Martyr’s dream Friday, Justice
(Retribution) Friday are but some of the examples of demonstrations organized during
2011 and 2012. In 2013 and 2014 under Adly Mansour and Sisi respectively, the
motivational frame for youth changed from martyrs to prisoners. This, however, is
beyond the scope of this short survey.
Although this rhetoric proved convincing and motivating enough to some
people to engage in demonstrations, the over-use and sometimes abuse of the martyrs’
blood by political forces, led people at times to lose sympathy and regard the issue of
secondary importance. Some youth admitted to me that the cause of the martyrs is a
just one; however, their cause is an offshoot of the initial problem. “They [the
consecutive regimes in power] succeeded in distracting us from our real demands.
What we should have invested more in was to work on realizing the dreams the
martyrs died for”, one activist confided to me143. Hence the slogan was sometimes
modified in demonstrations to be “We will get their rights and we will realize their
dream.”144 The symbolism of martyrs, however, continued to have a great appeal to
the youth, based on their feelings of guilt, loyalty, and the desire for retribution.
Dignity
Another motivational frame the youth used is the appeal to dignity. Daily
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humiliation, especially at the hands of the police was one of the main reasons for the
January 25 uprising. One of the main slogans of the revolution was the call for human
dignity which was crushed under Mubarak’s 30 year rule. Dignity was at the root of
the demonstrations to the extent that some dubbed the Egyptian Revolution a “dignity
revolution.” 145 The brutal use of force by the military and security forces during
SCAF’s time provided a momentum for youth movements to appeal once more to that
feeling. Abuses against female protestors in particular were highlighted to harness the
sympathy of the people. Following the cabinet clashes in December 2011 when
female protestors were stripped and dragged in the street, a million-man
demonstration, bearing the title “Free Women of Egypt”, was called. The slogan
which dominated the day was “Down, down with military rule; Egypt’s girls are a red
line”146. Two weeks later, the weekly demonstration was called “Friday of Pride and
Dignity” in which demonstrators demanded an end to military rule, holding the
military accountable for the mismanagement of the transitional phase.147
Protection of the Revolution
This frame, in contrast, to the first two frames is primarily addressed to those
who believe in the revolution in the first place. It does not seek to convince or
mobilize bystanders, rather it attempts to persuade its adherents of the urgency and
importance of their participation. The youth repeatedly depicted the revolution as
endangered to incite their fellow members and the wider public who believe in the
importance of the revolution. For a generation who has lived its entire life under
Mubarak’s repression, the revolution represented the biggest achievement worthy of
defending. The revolution, embodying the hope of the youth for a better future, was
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an abstract symbol that could express all their demands. Appealing to save the
revolution meant saving freedoms, fighting corruption, opposing repression and
guaranteeing no return to the old regime. The frame of protection or defense works in
a number of ways. First, it highlights the element of agency, reminding the people of
their collective power but also appealing to the sense of individual responsibility “it is
your duty to defend the revolution.” Second, it instills an element of urgency. By
invoking the rhetoric of “danger”, “protection”, “defense” activists created an urge to
take part in the demonstrations as it is something that cannot wait.
4.4 Resonance
After defining the three main core-framing tasks and how the youth dealt with
them, I will now examine how resonant these frames were with the people.
Resonance, as previously explained, has two main components: credibility and
salience. In the next few pages, I will analyze these two elements in order to
understand the reasons behind some frames used by the youth being more successful
in yielding public support than others. In particular, The issue of cultural resonance,
also known as narrative fidelity, is especially difficult for youth to address and is
more difficult to change than other components. As such, I will give it special
attention.
4.4.1 Credibility
Credibility is an issue the revolutionary youth struggled with on various
levels. In Egypt, age is an important factor in conferring credibility. Since credibility
is often related to knowledge, experience and expertise, the older you were, the wiser,
more knowledgeable, and, by consequence, more respectable you were perceived.
The youth were often perceived as inexperienced enthusiasts who do not possess
enough legitimacy to be taken seriously. Popularity is another contributing factor to
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credibility. Public figures are generally seen more credible just by the fact of being
known to the people. Understanding this culture, the youth tried to get around this by
a “credentializing” process in which they sought the support of “credible” persons in
the eyes of the community so they could be taken seriously. The first instance where
this was clearly manifested was the campaign leading up to the March 2011
referendum. The youth who were in favor of a “no” vote campaigned for their choice
by creating a video in which youth figures, as well as well-known politicians,
businessmen, professors, actors, singers, and writers all appeared justifying a no
vote148.
In terms of empirical credibility, the youth were successful in creating all sorts
of documentation for their claims. Social media provided them a platform through
which they could publish videos, pictures and statistics supporting their claims. The
issue, however, was one of outreach to the people. Since the youth did not control the
media and had little financial means to create a news outlet that represented their
cause, these empirical evidences were not displayed to the people. Using innovative
ways, the youth developed the idea of “Kazeboon”, a campaign using a portable
projector and videos of SCAF’s human rights violations and contradictory statements
to display in public squares. As one activist put it, “If people cannot watch us on TV,
we will go to them in the streets and let them watch the truth for themselves.”
Finally, frame consistency is also essential in acquiring credibility in the eyes
of the people. Here the youth’s demands proved to be consistent. The problem,
however, was in the perceived inconsistency between the ideals being advocated and
the methods used. For example, the youth called for democracy and free elections but
when parliamentary elections were held, only a few ran for office. In the presidential
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elections, disagreements between revolutionary youth led them to support different
candidates representing the revolution camp who all failed to make it to the second
round. Generally, youth’s reluctance to participate in formal politics was perceived as
inconsistent with their calls for change. In conclusion, for claims to be accepted by a
people, those three elements of credibility need to be present. Revolutionary youth
scored poorly on all three, This cost them the credibility they dearly sought.
4.4.2 Salience
All throughout the four years, the youth were consistently dragged into
political battles that did not concern the majority of the people. Instead of focusing on
economic and social demands of the revolution that were the main reason average
laypeople joined reason for the joining of laymen, the revolutionary youth engaged in
elitist contestations that the people could not relate to. This could be seen in the
infamous debate of the “Constitution First” or “Elections First” which drained the
youth for months. Following the constitutional amendments referendum in March
2011, political forces were divided into two groups with the liberal opposition, the
majority of the youth and nascent political parties calling for drafting the constitution
before holding parliamentary elections, while the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists
were in favor of early elections. Eventually, the SCAF decided to hold parliamentary
elections in November and December 2011 before writing the constitution. The
debate, however, resurfaced in 2012 with the political forces arguing once more
whether presidential elections this time should take place first or the drafting of the
constitution. Interestingly, many of the youth represented in movements such as April
6 Movement and Masrena and political parties such as Al-Adl and Al-Tayyar AlMasry switched roles, this time advocating “President First” and vehemently
opposing writing a constitution under military rule. The first Friday million-man
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demonstration in February 2012 was held under the same title “President First”.
Moreover, We are All Khaled Said Page in conjunction with other youth movements,
launched a campaign titled “No constitution under Military Rule”. This seeming
contradiction could be explained by the fact that the youth hoped the presidential
elections could result in a revolutionary president, while in the case of the
parliamentary elections, it was widely predicted that the Muslim Brotherhood would
gain the plurality, if not the majority, of the seats and thus control the constitution
drafting process.
The debate, which garnered media attention and the focus of political forces,
lacked the saliency aspect for resonance, making it distant from the people. For the
majority of the people, the two options seemed equally insignificant. Centrality, the
first factor composing salience, was completely absent. Some youth tried to break that
dichotomy and redirect the public discourse to discuss people’s real issues. In the
midst of that heated debate, Mohamed Abo-elgheit, a young 22-year blogger and
student at the time wrote a blog titled “The Poor First, You Bastards!” in which he
tried to highlight the role of the poor in the revolution. Publishing pictures and stories
of poor martyrs for the first time in a challenge to the entrenched narrative, his post
got a lot of attention in the media and in the cyber world spreading to pages all over
Facebook and Twitter. Abo-elgheit’s attempt to break away from the existing elitist
frame and create an alternative discourse yielded a degree of success. For example,
following his post, We are All Khaled Said Page dedicated a lot of space to the
discussion of poverty and analyzing the issues Abo-elgheit’s raised in his note.
However, by and large, the youth were still stuck into the political elites debates
carefully and deliberately designed by the SCAF and could not impose their own
agenda.
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On the level of experiential commensurability, which is the second component
of salience, the youth also failed to make the link to people’s lives. The issues youth
advocated or opposed remained too abstract to the people who did not understand
their relevance to their daily lives. An issue like the militarization of the state, which
was a central feature in the youth’s discourse especially during the SCAF’s time, was
never broken down into tangible effect on people’s lives. Given the low literacy rate,
the youth’s rhetoric came across as too elitist and complicated for the masses to
understand and interact with. Some youth parties attempted to bridge this gap by
simplifying the concepts and drawing direct relationship between them and the
people. For example, during the debate preceding the voting on the 2012 constitution,
Masr Al-Qawiya Party youth launched a campaign that tried to take every objection to
the constitution and turn it into a real life example. However, these attempts remained
limited and got swapped away in the midst of the mega debates.
The “Elections First” or “Constitution First” debate is one example of an
issue that lacked salience. Another would be the debate surrounding the “civility” of
the state. Especially during the Muslim Brotherhood rule, the elites engaged in a
parochial debate concerning the nature of the state. After the “battle of ballots” in
March 2011, a destructive identity-based polarization increasingly found its way into
the political environment. The youth were not immune. The more the youth and
political elites engaged in these debates, the more the people became disenchanted by
the revolution and its prospects for affecting their lives. Almost all the youth activists
I interviewed admitted they engaged in the wrong battles and expressed remorse for
not giving precedence for economic and social demands that touch people’s lives. On
the local level, some groups were able to realize small victories, but on the national
discourse level, the frames remained every much determined by the major political
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actors. Hany El Gamal, a founding member of Al-Dostour party told me, “We were
for so long drained in the battle of titles. We need to make the move now to the battle
of content.”149 But even the Revolutionary Socialists who adopt economic and social
justice as their primary frame of action used rhetoric that was difficult for the people
to understand. The movement’s discourse, as a member of its political bureau
declared to me, reflected the ideological rigidity and the professional background of
the majority of the members.150 The discussion was relevant, especially for workers,
but the language was simply too distant from the laypeople. 151 In conclusion, the
types of issues and how relevant they are to the people are important but so are the
motivational frames and vocabularies of action used.
4.4.3 Cultural Resonance
The last factor determining people’s interaction with the demands is narrative
fidelity or cultural resonance. Culture has a great effect on which frames can
propagate. Success of the narratives and actions are determined by whether they
conform or contradict entrenched ideals and traditions in society. Youth’s beliefs and
attitudes contradicted the cultural tradition of the Egyptian people in two distinct
ways – respect and stability. First, respect of the military institution is part of the
popular culture since the 1952 Revolution. The military was generally seen before the
revolution as a professional and disciplined organization that was not corrupt as the
police was. Moreover, mandatory conscription meant that it is likely that everyone in
the people had a close relative or friend serving at the army at some point. This
reinforced the feeling that the army is part of the people. Finally, the legacy of the
1973 war, especially for the older generation added a hallow of respect and
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sacredness to the military who was perceived as the only army who achieved victory
for the Arabs against Israel. For all of those reasons, the infamous slogan “Down,
down with Military Rule” which the youth developed and continued to use over 2011
until mid 2012 was met with popular indignation. The youth repeatedly attempted to
differentiate between the SCAF, which Mubarak had appointed, and the army as a
patriotic institution, by declaring “The army is ours but the council [of Armed Forces]
is not.” 152 However, the media and the SCAF consistently made sure to blur the
differences in order to rid the revolutionaries of any support they may get from the
people. The swelling incidents of army soldiers using torture and lethal force against
protestors over the transitional period led some youth to reconsider their previous
assessment of the army being “ours”. The unprecedented confrontation with army
soldiers made the revolutionaries convinced they are not that different from the police
forces they for long considered an antagonist. Naturally, the media picked this and
used it to discredit the revolutionaries. The increasing information made available on
the “Officers Republic” 153 made the youth realize the issue transcends SCAF to
include the entire political and economic institutional militarization of the country.
For the people to see fault with this fact, the revolutionary youth had to engage in a
multi-level struggle.
Respect for the elderly is a second cultural convention the youth’s framing of
their demands contradicted. In the Egyptian culture, age begets respect. In spite of all
of Mubarak’s crimes, when he was strongly attacked by the youth following his
arrest, some called for “considering him like your father”. The youth’s often
challenge and sometimes disrespect for authority figures led them to be perceived as
“undisciplined” and hampered the resonance of their demands with the older
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generation.
Similarly, respect of public morals is considered of high importance in
Egyptian culture. It is interesting that the revolutionaries’ use of symbolic violence in
language has been more harshly condemned by the people than state’s practice of
physical violence. A famous example is the heated media interjection between
novelist Alaa Al Aswany and then Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik in the month
following Mubarak’s ouster. The older generation’s reaction to the episode centered
around the condemnation of Al Aswany’s insult to Shafik and the disrespectful
attitude he displayed towards his patriotic role as an army officer. The public’s
dismay at “disrespectful” attitude extend to the youth’s use of swear words and
obscenity in their online interactions. Youth activists such as Alaa Abdel Fattah
declared more than once that their use of symbolic/verbal violence was intentional
and is meant to hurt the image of the powerful who commit actual violence against
the powerless.154 Claiming a higher ground, however, The regime’s rhetoric, in its
depicting youth as morally decrepit, resonated with the people more than the youth’s.
Finally, the Egyptian culture is one that favors stability. It could be argued that
any society prefers the status quo, but in Egypt, the compulsion for stability over
Egyptian history led to the entrenchment of a culture of submission and nonconfrontation. Phrases such as emshi gamb el heit, meaning mind your own business
became the unofficial motto of the Mubarak years. For the youth to call for the rising
up against tyranny and risking your life was in total conflict with the conventional
wisdom. These cultural traditions attest to the fact that the battle in Egypt is primarily
demarcated along generational lines. This also raises the question of whether the
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revolution was indeed a popular revolution or essentially a youth revolution which the
people, under the impression they shared the same goals as the youth, joined.155
4.5 Framing Processes
Framing processes are important in understanding how frames develop and
interact; however, a full analysis of framing processes is beyond the scope of this
study and is not feasible in a chapter of this length. The two sets of discursive and
strategic processes were indirectly touched upon throughout the first half of the
chapter. In this final section, I would like to focus on contested processes and more
specifically counter-framing in the context of Egypt. The outcome of frame contests
between youth activists and their adversaries, as I will demonstrate, played a decisive
role in the degree of acceptance of the youth’s demands by the public.
Frame contests
The target of any framing activity is to reach out to the largest number of
possible adherents in order to mobilize them. However, the success or failure of
collective action frames is not merely a function of its content. Frames advocated by
social movements are subject to intense contestations that involve the movement’s
activists, the state as well as countermovements.156 Official frames developed by the
state and propagated by the media to combat the social movement have a great impact
on the success prospects of the collective frames mobilized by the social movement.
In this section, I discuss how the Egyptian regime characterized January 25th and
framed the youth who ignited it and their demands throughout the different time
periods. For the SCAF period, I examine the Facebook communiqués the SCAF
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issued during its first year of ruling. I also refer to press conferences and speeches by
General Hussein Tantawy and other members of the military council whenever
appropriate. For Morsi and Sisi’s presidencies, I mainly rely on the coverage of their
speeches and televised interviews. In addition to official frames, media frames, which
in the case of Egypt greatly overlap with the official narrative, will also be analyzed.
The framing of the youth by their adversaries took different shapes over the
past four years. At first they were hailed as “the pure youth of January 25” but as soon
as clashes intensified with the SCAF, they started to be framed both by the media and
the regime as “troublemakers” and “thugs”. During Morsi’s time, they were framed as
“immoral” and “irreligious”. Finally, during Sisi’s time they were framed as
“traitors”, “foreign funded”, and in some cases “Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers”.
In all three phases, two parallel frames existed simultaneously. There was always an
attempt to differentiate between the “real or true revolutionary youth” and the
disruptive youth who “misuse democracy” and engage in vandalism of public
property or disruption of the political process. The SCAF’s discourse mirrors the
official narrative favorably viewing January 25th while delegitimizing all
demonstrations that followed it. In its first communiqué, SCAF called the revolution a
uniting and peaceful one that has impressed the world. In communiqué no 51, the
council called the revolution “one of the greatest revolutions of this time.” 157 SCAF
addressed the “pure youth of January 25th” who are patriotic and aware of the
responsibility entrusted to SCAF as per communiqué 24, while warning against the
“misguided” youth who Only seek to cause strife and raise disputes between the army
and the people. The official frame, for the most part, remained one that talked
positively about the youth in the attempt to integrate them into the system, while
157
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charactering the protesting youth a disruptive minority.
Similarly, in their multiple statements and speeches, Morsi and Sisi appealed
to the youth. Speaking at a ceremony in Cairo University, Sisi addressed the youth by
saying: “"I want Egypt's youth to be by my side.” He added, “I love Egypt's youth and
consider them my children.”

158

In different speeches, he called for youth’s

participation in the upcoming parliamentary elections159 trying to frame them as part
of the solution. However, the counter-framing continued for the politically active
youth and more importantly measurements on the ground spoke louder.
The counterframing of the youth used by the regime and the media appealed to
the people’s desire for stability. By depicting the youth as elements who are causing
disruption, obstructing the democratic path, and leading to the worsening of the
economic situation, the regime created an easy enemy for the people. Instead, of
addressing and changing policies, the problem was framed as one caused by the
uncooperative youth who are insistent on disrupting the system. While the factor of
stability remained present in the counter-framing throughout the three different
regimes, the discourse took different forms. Before Morsi’s victory in the second
round of the presidential elections, the youth were seen as an essential part of the
political landscape. In Fairmont agreement Morsi gave the revolutionary youth many
promises with regard to inclusion of all parties into power. During Morsi’s
presidency, and as identity-based polarization intensified, the pro-Muslim
Brotherhood media undermined the youth’s religiosity and morality to discredit them.
Appealing to religious and moral sentiments, the personal conduct and beliefs of
158
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activists were often brought into question and used to delegitimize their demands.160
During Sisi’s time, the regime whose legitimacy rested on its ouster of the Muslim
Brotherhood, appealed to the sense of fear. Making use of the “newly discovered”
nationalist and patriotic feelings, the youth were conveniently portrayed in the media
as foreign-funded traitors engaged in a grand conspiracy against Egypt. Sympathizing
with the Muslim Brotherhood became a general accusation to anyone who actively
opposed the regime.
A key point in all of these counter-framing endeavors is the role of the media.
The target audiences of these counter-frames are bystanders who are open to changing
their views and taking sides. One major challenge the youth faced in constructing
their oppositional frames is having access to the media. During the SCAF’s rule,
activists had better “standing” in the media, meaning they had a voice rather than
mere coverage of their mentioning in the news. While the media allowed some youth
voices to appear, they carefully chose those whose narrative does not greatly
contradict that of the regime. Standing, however, is not automatically granted by the
media. In order to gain standing, the youth had to contend with other political officials
and journalists.161 While officials can have access to the media forum when they wish,
the youth have to earn their standing by actions that draw media attention e.g.
demonstrations, new campaign etc. These actions in themselves affect the message
they wish to convey to the people and sometimes affirmatively confirming the
regime’s counter-frames. In other words, having mere access to the media does not
translate into the ability to oppose the regime’s counter-framing. Another issue with
the media that featured prominently is the internal rivalries between the youth inside
160
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each SMO. Those whose actions create the standing often found that their preferred
frame is poorly represented by those who became the media designated
spokespersons. 162 These internal movement contests can become the subject of
media’s coverage, distracting the public from the real issues and contributing to the
counterframing. This could be seen for example in the case of 6th of April movement
and its eventual splitting into two movements. In brief, the youth’s inadequacy in
developing effective strategies to deal with the media led to the corroboration of the
official counter-frames. Relying primarily on social media to oppose these frames, the
youth essentially were absorbed into monologues and could not reach out to the wider
bystanders who were not already engaged but heavily influenced by official media.
4.6 Conclusion
Framing is an active verb to signify that the construction and development of
frames are a dynamic and never ending process. In this chapter, I tried to reveal the
major frames the youth used in identifying the problem with the regime and proposing
a solution and alternatives. I also identified the three vocabularies of motives they
used to mobilize support: rights of the martyrs, dignity and pride, and protection of
the revolution. As I demonstrated, these frames found little resonance due to the
absence of credibility and salience of the demands. The role of the dominant culture
in determining the extent to which these frames resonated was also highlighted.
Finally, the chapter ended by examining the frames contests the youth engaged in
with the regime particularly the effect of the media on the prospects for challenging
counter-frames.
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Conclusion
This research started with a personal quest to find answers for the ever-evasive
question of “what went wrong” with the Egyptian Revolution. Being an
activist/researcher myself made the issue so poignant. In this research, I used a
threefold theoretical framework to look at the apparent failure of the youth to
maintain a position for themselves in the political scene and realize the goals of the
Egyptian Revolution. The analysis leaned more towards analyzing the early phase of
the transitional period being the most formative in the youth’s revolutionary
experience. The purpose of this thesis was not to analyze or assess the current
moment as much as it was an attempt at understanding the processes which led to
present consequences. Thoroughly examining the three phases of the post-Mubarak
transition would necessitate three separate theses. Investigating a topic so dynamic
proved to be a strenuous task. The ever-changing situations and positions not only
affected the analysis of current events but also altered and nuanced the understanding
and perceptions of previous stances and events.
In this thesis, I prefaced with the argument that in order to understand the
Egyptian Revolution and its development, it is indispensible to analyze the youth
element as an integral part of the study. Looking at the revolutionary youth as a social
movement, this research utilized three main theoretical approaches to study their
activities: Resource Mobilization Theory, Political Opportunity Structure and
Framing.
In chapter two, I looked specifically at leadership and organization as two
problematic issues the youth had to deal with. The leaderlessness of the Egyptian
Revolution caused by the fact that no single coherent group could claim responsibility
for it imprinted much of the political realities during the period following Mubarak’s
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ouster. As for organization, two interrelated issues capture the youth’s organizational
dilemma. The first one is the official vs. unofficial political organization dichotomy –
the choice of whether to formally engage the political process in the form of political
parties or remain as pressure groups affecting the system using street mobilization.
Related to this issue is the choice between hierarchical structures of organization and
network models. The chapter also examined the issues the youth faced with other
kinds of resources such as moral, cultural and material resources.
In the following chapter, I tried to analyze the effects of the political context
on the youth’s development from revolutionary to political movements. Youth are
often criticized for their unwillingness to join formal politics and resort to street
politics manifesting in protests. In that chapter, I demonstrated how the nature of the
political system in Egypt, being a closed and strong system restricted the youth’s
opportunity to join the political process on equal terms and led them to use
confrontational strategies. The state’s use of repression had a direct effect in the same
direction. The more the state used repression, the more the youth got engaged in side
battles that distracted them from developing long-term strategies. These institutional
structures must not, however, overshadow the element of agency. As many activists
admitted in my interviews with them, the revolutionary youth had the option of
turning these institutional obstacles into opportunities for other forms of political
engagement. The main problem is that youth either focused too much on the
institutional structures, trying to penetrate the system or they disbelieved in the
prospects of accessing the system and found in protest and informal organizations the
tool to affect the regime from outside. Both strategies, however, overlooked an
important factor – the people. As one youth activist put it: “we were so consumed
with reaching out to power, instead of reaching out to the people. We ended up losing
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both.”163 This is not a call for forsaking formal politics or politics altogether for that
matter. Instead, it is a suggestion for practicing politics by other means. Some youths
realized that the institutional obstacles curtail any chances for their penetration into
the system and became convinced that the any solution would have to be geared
toward the empowerment of people as its top priority.164
In chapter four I attempted to analyze the problems with the youth’s rhetoric
and presentation of themselves and their ideas. A summary of these issues can be
identified in four points. First, one major reason for the failure of the youth to present
a convincing discourse to the people is the vagueness of their diagnostic and
prognostic frames. While the former, arguably was better conceived of, the latter is
where the youth’s main problem lied. The youth did not form alternatives on the
intellectual or the practical levels for reasons discussed thoroughly in the chapter. The
end result is that they presented the old regime with a golden opportunity to step in to
fill the void they created by the ouster of Mubarak and then Morsi. Second, the
motivational frames the youth used remained “activist-oriented”. After a while,
martyrs’ rights and protection of the revolution were not strong enough reasons for
the laypeople to join mobilization. The distortion of the revolution in the media
succeeded in leading the people to perceive the revolution and even the martyrs as the
reasons for the deteriorating economic conditions and political instability. People
were unable to make the connection between the demands of the revolutionaries and
their own lives. Furthermore, the absence of any political alternative made
demonstrations seem like ways of letting out frustration more than effecting policy
change. Dignity is an important motivational factor but the increasingly worsening
economic pressures and instability in people’s daily lives following the revolution led
163
164
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some of them to believe that forgoing some of their rights for the sake of the
country’s political advancement is an acceptable price. Additionally, the brainwashing
effect of the media led people to disbelieve the credibility of many human rights
violations happening to the revolutionaries or worse, perceiving it as necessary. Third,
the political battles the youth, as well as other political parties were focused on were
of marginal importance to the people, lacking all aspects of resonance. This was
reaffirmed by the use of elitist rhetoric in expressing and discussing those demands.
In short, once more the absence of the appeal to the people on their own terms was a
major setback to the youth. It could be argued however that these ailments plagued all
political actors and not specifically the youth. This could be correct to a certain
degree, however, what the youth lacked in terms of rhetoric compared to other actors
such as the Muslim Brotherhood for example is cultural resonance. The youth’s
demands by definition were in contradiction with many tenets in Egyptian culture;
nevertheless, they directed little efforts toward tailoring the message to the people
who found the youth’s rhetoric or characterization of the issues offensive.
Finally, this study is one more effort at understanding of how the youth ended
up where they are now. Rather than being prescriptive, the findings of this research
serve the purpose of better comprehending the reasons for the youth’s failure in order
to draw lessons for the future. While this thesis was an attempt at diagnosis, more
efforts are needed to transform these findings into practical solutions. My hope is that
this work and similar ones open more opportunities for discussion. It is timely for the
youth who have actively participated in the revolution to engage in an extensive and
thorough re-evaluation of their revolutionary experience. As for scholars, it is equally
an opportunity to revisit some of the theoretical assumptions regarding the
relationship between youth, revolutions, and political transition.
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